Background
Jill Stansfield (mother) and Todd Patti (father) are the unmarried parents of two children who separated in January 2023. In March 2023, the father ceased contributing to household expenses and subsequently relocated to Florida. In October 2023, the mother — a New Hampshire resident — filed a parenting petition in the 9th Circuit Court–Nashua Family Division seeking final parenting orders and child support. The father did not appear, and the trial court held a default hearing in August 2024.
The trial court issued a final parenting decree and parenting plan but declined to enter a child support order, later explaining on the mother’s motion to reconsider that RSA 546-B:31 — part of New Hampshire’s enactment of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) — stripped it of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the court read that provision to authorize a child support order only when the person seeking the order resides outside New Hampshire, which was not the case here because the mother is a New Hampshire resident. The mother appealed.
The New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Bureau of Child Support Services, appeared as amicus curiae in support of reversal.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed and remanded, holding that RSA 546-B:31 had no effect on the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Writing for the court, Justice Gould explained that subject matter jurisdiction over child support proceedings is conferred on the circuit court by RSA 490-D:2 and RSA 490-F:3, and nothing in UIFSA divested it of that authority under the facts presented.
The court reasoned that RSA 546-B:31 — UIFSA Article 4, Section 401 — applies only to a “responding tribunal” in a two-state proceeding, meaning one that receives a forwarded petition from another state. Because the mother invoked the long-arm jurisdiction of her home-state court over the nonresident father under RSA 546-B:3, this was a one-state proceeding, not a two-state one. The circuit court was therefore not a “responding tribunal,” and Article 4 was inapplicable.
The governing provision was instead RSA 546-B:11-a (UIFSA Article 2), which expressly states that when a tribunal asserts long-arm personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, Articles 3 through 6 of UIFSA — including Article 4’s RSA 546-B:31 — do not apply except as specified, and the tribunal must apply the procedural and substantive law of the forum state. Because the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over the father and the proceeding was a one-state matter, it retained full authority to issue a child support order.
Key Takeaways
- RSA 546-B:31 (UIFSA § 401) limits only “responding tribunals” in two-state proceedings; it does not restrict a home-state court that has obtained long-arm personal jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent.
- When a petitioner uses long-arm jurisdiction to bring a nonresident respondent before a New Hampshire court, the proceeding is a one-state matter governed by RSA 546-B:11-a, which excludes UIFSA Articles 3 through 6 (with narrow exceptions) and requires the court to apply New Hampshire substantive and procedural law.
- Subject matter jurisdiction over child support in New Hampshire circuit courts flows from RSA 490-D:2 and RSA 490-F:3; UIFSA does not divest that jurisdiction in one-state long-arm proceedings.
- Under UIFSA, a petitioner with a viable long-arm basis has two options: litigate in the home state (one-state proceeding) or initiate a two-state proceeding in the respondent’s state — choosing the first option keeps the matter entirely outside Article 4’s framework.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies a jurisdictional question that could trap custodial parents: a trial court’s cramped reading of RSA 546-B:31 would have left New Hampshire resident parents unable to obtain child support in their home court whenever the other parent had moved out of state, forcing them into the more burdensome two-state UIFSA process even when long-arm jurisdiction was readily available. The Supreme Court’s holding confirms that the one-state long-arm path is fully effective for support orders.
For family law practitioners, the ruling underscores the importance of distinguishing one-state long-arm proceedings from two-state UIFSA proceedings at the outset of any interstate support matter. New Hampshire courts that have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident party under RSA 546-B:3 retain subject matter jurisdiction to issue, modify, and enforce support orders, with UIFSA’s Article 4 restrictions simply having no purchase in that procedural posture.