Background
Fredy Hernandez was indicted in Atlantic County for first-degree aggravated sexual assault and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, arising from an alleged sexual assault of a 12-year-old victim. At trial in July 2025, the defendant did not dispute that sexual intercourse had occurred but argued the State had failed to prove the victim’s age beyond a reasonable doubt based solely on her testimony.
After approximately five hours of jury deliberation spread across two days, the jury sent notes indicating it could not reach a unanimous verdict on one of the two counts. The trial court, concerned about potential double jeopardy implications, declined to accept a partial verdict and instead declared a mistrial on both counts without determining which count the jury had resolved or retrieving the verdict sheet. The court then entered a mistrial on the entire indictment.
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that retrial on either count would violate his Fifth Amendment and New Jersey constitutional protections. The trial court denied the motion, finding that a mistrial was “manifestly necessary” given the overlapping facts and elements of the charges. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, focusing on a single issue: whether dismissal of the indictment was required by double jeopardy protections.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Division reversed and held that the indictment must be dismissed. The court held that the trial court erred by refusing to accept a partial verdict when that was a viable alternative to declaring a complete mistrial. Applying the Blockburger same-elements test from United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993), and affirmed by New Jersey in State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83 (2017), the court determined that the two charged offenses are not the same offense because each contains elements the other does not: (1) aggravated sexual assault requires the victim to be under 13 years old, while endangering requires only that the victim be under 18; and (2) endangering uniquely requires proof that the sexual conduct “would impair or debauch the morals” of the child—an element absent from the aggravated sexual assault statute.
Because the charges were sufficiently distinct under Blockburger, accepting a partial verdict would not have violated double jeopardy principles. The trial court thus abused its discretion by rejecting the partial verdict option based on an outdated “same-evidence” test that both federal and state supreme courts had rejected. However, the court held that the appropriate remedy was dismissal because, once the jury was discharged and a complete mistrial declared, it became impossible to determine which count, if any, the jury had unanimously decided. Following State v. Salter, 425 N.J. Super. 504 (2012), where uncertainty about what was acquitted bars retrial, the court found that there remained “a colorable argument” that retrying either count would violate double jeopardy. Because the jury cannot be reassembled to clarify its position and the State cannot prove with certainty that the defendant was not acquitted of either count, the Constitution prohibits retrial.
Key Takeaways
- Trial courts must accept partial verdicts when the jury has unanimously decided some counts but remains deadlocked on others, rather than declaring a complete mistrial as an alternative.
- The Blockburger same-elements test—not the rejected same-evidence test—determines whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes: if each statute requires an element the other does not, retrial on a different count does not violate double jeopardy.
- Once a jury is discharged and a complete mistrial entered without clarifying which counts were resolved, uncertainty about potential acquittals can itself bar retrial under double jeopardy protections, even if the offenses are technically distinct.
- Trial courts bear a heavy burden to demonstrate manifest necessity for a mistrial over a defendant’s objection, and must consider viable alternatives before terminating trial.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces fundamental double jeopardy protections by holding that procedural errors—specifically, a trial court’s refusal to accept a partial verdict—can result in dismissal of charges even where the underlying offenses may be legally distinct. The court emphasized that the Constitution is not satisfied by speculation: the State cannot retry a defendant when there exists genuine uncertainty about whether a jury acquitted him of any charged offense. For trial practitioners, the decision provides clear guidance that partial verdicts are the appropriate procedure when a jury is unanimously resolved on some counts but deadlocked on others.
The decision also clarifies New Jersey’s application of the Blockburger same-elements test, correcting the trial court’s misapplication of the outdated same-evidence test. This matters because it establishes that charges with overlapping facts may still constitute distinct offenses if each has unique statutory elements. Finally, the opinion underscores that trial courts’ discretion in declaring mistrials is not unlimited: they must consider whether accepting a partial verdict would serve the interests of both justice and finality, and cannot decline that option based on speculative concerns about double jeopardy that the law does not support.