Background
Bobcat of Mandan, Inc. (BM) has operated as an authorized Bobcat equipment dealer since 1973, selling and servicing multiple equipment categories from locations in Mandan and Dickinson, North Dakota under dealer sales agreements (DSAs) with Doosan Bobcat North America, Inc. (Bobcat). In September 2024, Bobcat issued written notice terminating both DSAs effective December 9, 2024, citing BM’s alleged false and misleading statements and alteration of business records in connection with DSA compliance reporting. Rather than invoke its contractual right to immediate termination, Bobcat gave BM ninety days’ notice to locate a buyer for the dealerships.
In December 2024, BM filed suit challenging the termination and invoked the automatic stay provision of North Dakota’s farm equipment dealer statute, N.D.C.C. § 51-07-01.1(3), which stays a termination during the pendency of litigation challenging it. BM also alleged violations of the heavy construction equipment franchise termination statute, N.D.C.C. § 51-20.1-03, though that statute contains no automatic stay. Bobcat moved to dissolve or modify the automatic stay, arguing it extends only to lawn and garden equipment — conceding coverage of three product lines — but not to construction equipment such as skid-steer loaders, compact track loaders, and excavators, which Bobcat contended fall exclusively under the heavy construction equipment statute. Bobcat supported this position with industry data, market share figures, BM’s own sales records showing only 9.3% agricultural end-use, and 2017 legislative history indicating Bobcat equipment was not intended to be covered by the farm equipment dealer statute.
In July 2025, the district court denied the motion, concluding the stay is triggered automatically upon the filing of a qualifying action, that the merits of which statute applies are questions for the factfinder, and that the court lacked discretion to dissolve or modify a stay imposed by statute rather than court order. Bobcat filed a notice of appeal before the district court could address a pending Rule 54(b) certification request, and separately asked the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory jurisdiction.
The Court’s Holding
The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court first analyzed whether the district court’s order refusing to dissolve the automatic stay was appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(3), which covers orders that grant, refuse, modify, or dissolve an injunction. Although the statute uses the term “automatic stay” rather than “injunction,” the court concluded the stay functions as a statutory temporary injunction — it temporarily enjoins Bobcat’s conduct (the termination) rather than halting a judicial proceeding — and therefore falls within the scope of § 28-27-02(3).
However, the court held that because the order is interlocutory, appellate review also requires certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Bobcat had requested such certification but filed its notice of appeal before the district court ruled on that request, leaving no Rule 54(b) order in place. Without certification, the interlocutory order was not appealable, and the court dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The court also declined to exercise its discretionary supervisory jurisdiction. Supervisory writs issue only in extraordinary cases involving vital public interests or fundamental constitutional rights when no adequate alternative remedy exists. Bobcat raised no constitutional claims and presented only a private commercial contract dispute, which the court found insufficient to meet that demanding standard. The court distinguished cases where supervisory jurisdiction was exercised — which involved constitutional rights such as free speech, abortion regulation, and the right to jury trial — from the purely private dispute before it.
Key Takeaways
- North Dakota’s farm equipment dealer automatic stay under N.D.C.C. § 51-07-01.1(3) functions as a statutory temporary injunction, making an order refusing to dissolve it appealable under the injunction prong of N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(3) — but Rule 54(b) certification is still required because the order is interlocutory.
- A party seeking interlocutory appeal of an order on an automatic stay must obtain Rule 54(b) certification before filing the notice of appeal; filing prematurely does not preserve jurisdiction.
- The North Dakota Supreme Court will not exercise supervisory jurisdiction over private commercial disputes absent extraordinary circumstances, vital public interests, or implicated constitutional rights — a manufacturer’s business injury from a statutory stay does not clear that bar.
- The court left open — for the factfinder at trial — the dispositive merits question of whether Bobcat’s construction equipment falls under the farm equipment dealer statute or the separate heavy construction equipment franchise statute.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the procedural pathway for manufacturers and distributors seeking to challenge statutory automatic stays in North Dakota dealer-termination disputes. By characterizing the farm equipment dealer statute’s automatic stay as a functional injunction, the court confirms that refusals to dissolve such stays are subject to the appellate jurisdiction statute — but the interlocutory certification requirement remains a mandatory gatekeeping step that cannot be bypassed by filing a premature notice of appeal. Dealers facing termination can therefore expect the stay to hold through trial absent proper appellate procedure by the manufacturer.
More broadly, the decision signals the limits of supervisory jurisdiction as an end-run around Rule 54(b). Bobcat’s framing of the issue as affecting its “fundamental rights” did not suffice; the court reaffirmed that supervisory review is reserved for constitutional questions and matters of important public concern, not ordinary commercial disputes between private parties. Manufacturers and franchisors litigating dealer terminations in North Dakota must plan for extended stays of termination while litigation proceeds and cannot count on expedited appellate relief.