Background
Christa Sandstrom appealed from a Grand Forks County district court order that denied her oral motion for a continuance, denied her motion to modify parenting time, found her in contempt, and awarded Courtney Krueger attorney’s fees and make-up parenting time as a remedial sanction. She also challenged a separate order setting the amount of Krueger’s attorney’s fees. The appeal was submitted on the briefs, with Kelsey L. Hankey representing Krueger and Dewayne Johnston representing Sandstrom. The State of North Dakota appeared in the caption as statutory real party in interest.
Sandstrom sought a continuance during the evidentiary hearing after the district court declined to require two witnesses to testify about an active criminal investigation. The court offered her the choice of withdrawing her motion for later refiling or proceeding without the witnesses’ testimony. She elected to proceed. On the merits of modification, Sandstrom argued that the court’s findings were inadequate for appellate review and that excluding testimony about the investigation improperly prevented her from proving a material change in circumstances.
The contempt ruling rested on the district court’s findings that Sandstrom willfully and inexcusably withheld the children from Krueger and stopped communicating with him. The court ordered 19 weekends of make-up parenting time for Krueger. Sandstrom characterized that sanction as punitive rather than remedial. Separately, Krueger filed a timely motion for attorney’s fees, and the district court set the amount after Sandstrom had filed her notice of appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The per curiam court summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4), while declining to address the separate order fixing the amount of attorney’s fees. On the continuance, the court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard described in Schrodt v. Schrodt, 2022 ND 64, ¶ 8, 971 N.W.2d 861, recognizing the district court’s broad discretion over the progress and conduct of a trial. It concluded that denying the continuance was not an abuse of discretion and summarily affirmed that ruling under Rule 35.1(a)(4).
On parenting time, the court reiterated that modification requires both a material change in circumstances since the previous parenting-time order and a modification in the child’s best interests, citing Prchal v. Prchal, 2011 ND 62, ¶ 11, 795 N.W.2d 693. A material change consists of important new facts unknown when the initial custody decree or parenting-time order was entered, citing Wolt v. Wolt, 2011 ND 170, ¶ 19, 803 N.W.2d 534. The district court made sufficient findings concerning the abuse allegations and the children’s best-interests factors and found no material change since the prior judgment. Those findings were not clearly erroneous, so the supreme court summarily affirmed under Rule 35.1(a)(2).
Applying Harger v. Harger, 2002 ND 76, ¶ 14, 644 N.W.2d 182, the court held that the contempt findings were not clearly erroneous and that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in finding contempt or awarding make-up parenting time as a remedial sanction. It also held that N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(e)(2) and 54(e)(2)(C) authorized the district court to decide Krueger’s timely fee motion after the appeal was filed. But the amount challenge was not preserved: Sandstrom’s notice of appeal predated the fee-amount order, and she neither amended it nor filed a second notice designating that order as required by N.D.R.App.P. 3(c)(2). The court therefore declined to address the amount, not because it resolved the record-support argument, but because that order had not been appealed.
Key Takeaways
- The continuance denial, denial of parenting-time modification, contempt finding, and remedial sanctions were summarily affirmed.
- The 19 weekends of make-up parenting time were upheld as a remedial sanction on these findings, not declared appropriate in every contempt case.
- A trial court may decide a timely attorney’s-fee motion after an appeal is filed under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(e)(2)(C).
- A party seeking review of a later fee-amount order must properly designate it through an amended or second notice of appeal.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes authority to decide a post-appeal fee motion from appellate preservation of a challenge to the resulting amount. Although the district court could act after the appeal began, Sandstrom’s unamended, earlier notice did not preserve review of the later order.
The opinion also applies different standards to different rulings: abuse of discretion for continuances and contempt sanctions, and clear-error review of the underlying findings on modification and contempt. Its affirmance is tied to the record and procedural circumstances presented, including Sandstrom’s election to proceed without the disputed testimony.