Background
Mitchell Sanderson, a self-represented litigant, sued Walsh County Clerk of Court Beverly Demers and Deputy Clerk of Court Michelle Flanders, alleging they violated state law by failing to take and file an oath of office. Sanderson demanded sweeping relief: forfeiture of the clerks’ bonds to him personally, removal from office, nullification of all prior rulings in his cases, punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensation for emotional distress.
Defendants moved to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and sought attorney’s fees on the ground that the complaint was frivolous. The Walsh County District Court granted the motion, dismissed the complaint with prejudice, and awarded attorney’s fees. Sanderson appealed, arguing that constitutional and statutory oath requirements applicable to “members” of the judicial branch and “civil officers” extended to unified judicial system employees such as the clerk and deputy clerk.
Sanderson pointed to N.D. Const. art. XI, § 4; N.D.C.C. ch. 44-01; and several other statutes, as well as a footnote in State v. Stuart, 544 N.W.2d 158 (N.D. 1996), as authority that district court clerks must take an oath. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal de novo and the fee award for abuse of discretion.
The Court’s Holding
The court unanimously affirmed. It held that neither the constitutional oath requirement nor N.D.C.C. § 44-01-05 applies to Demers and Flanders because they are unelected, unappointed employees of the unified judicial system — not “civil officers.” The statutory definition of “civil officer” expressly includes elected officials and individuals appointed by elected officials; the filing requirement, which presupposes a commission, appointment, or certificate of election, confirms that unelected and unappointed employees fall outside the term. Applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the court concluded the legislature impliedly exempted such employees from the oath requirement, consistent with the “inferior officers” carve-out in Article XI, § 4.
The court systematically rejected each alternative statutory basis Sanderson advanced. N.D.C.C. § 44-05-01 governs who may administer oaths, not who must take them. N.D.C.C. § 27-05.2-07 applies only to ex officio clerks — county-designated officials — not unified judicial system employees. N.D.C.C. § 27-03-02 is limited to the Supreme Court clerk and that clerk’s deputy. And the Stuart footnote relied on county-officer statutes (N.D.C.C. §§ 11-10-09, 11-10-13) that apply only to clerks employed by the county, not by the unified judicial system.
On the fee issue, the court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the claims frivolous under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2). Because Sanderson himself alleged the clerks were unified judicial system employees and then invoked statutes that plainly do not cover such employees, there was a complete absence of supporting law, and no reasonable person could have expected a court to rule in his favor.
Key Takeaways
- Constitutional and statutory oath requirements in North Dakota apply to elected officials and their appointees (“civil officers”), not to unelected, unappointed employees of the unified judicial system such as district court clerks.
- The Stuart footnote citing oath obligations for district court clerks was limited to clerks employed by the county under county-officer statutes and does not extend to clerks employed by the unified judicial system.
- A frivolous-claim finding under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2) — and the mandatory attorney’s fee award that follows — is appropriate where the plaintiff’s own pleaded facts demonstrate that the invoked statutes cannot apply.
Why It Matters
The decision draws a clear line between the oath obligations of elected and appointed public officers and the employment conditions of state court staff within the unified judicial system. Litigants who have lost in court and seek to void adverse rulings by challenging court employees’ credentials face a high bar: the structural and statutory arguments must be grounded in provisions that actually cover those employees, not provisions designed for elected or appointed officials.
The case also reinforces North Dakota’s frivolous-litigation fee-shifting regime. When a plaintiff’s own allegations negate the applicability of every cited statute, the mandatory fee award under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-01(2) is a near-certain consequence — a pointed reminder that creative but legally unfounded theories carry real financial risk for self-represented litigants.