Background
Richard Romanyshyn entered a conditional plea of guilty in the District Court of Stark County, preserving his right to appeal the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. Romanyshyn, his counsel, and the State all signed both a consent for conditional plea and a conditional plea of guilty, and the district court entered an order accepting the conditional plea. The plea arrangement was intended to comply with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), which allows defendants to plead guilty while reserving appellate review of an adverse pretrial ruling.
Despite the signed documents and the court’s order, the resulting criminal judgment did not include the word “conditional” or otherwise plainly reflect that the plea was conditional. The only language in the judgment touching on the appeal was a provision deferring payment of Romanyshyn’s fine until the Supreme Court ruled — language that the court found ambiguous and insufficient to satisfy the rule.
Romanyshyn appealed, asserting his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss. Both parties appeared to agree the plea was conditional, but the deficient judgment created a procedural obstacle the Supreme Court had to address before reaching the merits.
The Court’s Holding
The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the district court to correct the criminal judgment within 30 days to accurately reflect that Romanyshyn’s guilty plea was conditional. The court retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B) pending the correction.
The court reaffirmed that N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) imposes three mandatory requirements: written consent by the defendant, defense counsel, and prosecutor; a court order accepting the conditional plea; and a judgment that specifies the plea is conditional. While Rule 11 does not demand ritualistic compliance, the court held that substantial compliance requires the face of the judgment to make clear — without ambiguity — that the plea was conditional. The deferral-of-fine language in Romanyshyn’s judgment did not meet that standard because its meaning and intent were disputable.
The court drew on its recent decisions in State v. Vasquez, 2026 ND 9, and State v. Medina, 2025 ND 234, 29 N.W.3d 868, both of which had similarly remanded for correction of conditional-plea judgments that failed to comply with Rule 11(a)(2).
Key Takeaways
- N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2) requires the criminal judgment itself to reflect that a guilty plea is conditional; the word “conditional” need not appear, but the judgment must make that fact unambiguously clear on its face.
- A fine-deferral provision referencing a pending appeal does not substantially comply with Rule 11(a)(2) because it does not plainly indicate the plea was conditional.
- When a conditional-plea judgment is deficient, the Supreme Court will remand for correction rather than dismiss the appeal, retaining jurisdiction while the district court remedies the judgment.
Why It Matters
This decision is the latest in a series of North Dakota Supreme Court rulings — alongside Vasquez and Medina — emphasizing strict adherence to the judgment-specification requirement of Rule 11(a)(2). Defense attorneys and prosecutors in North Dakota must ensure that the criminal judgment expressly reflects any conditional plea; relying on supporting documents or collateral judgment language is not enough.
The practical stakes are significant: a judgment that fails to specify a conditional plea can cloud a defendant’s right to appellate review of preserved pretrial issues, leading to procedural detours that delay resolution of the underlying appeal. Courts and practitioners should treat the judgment as the authoritative record of the plea’s conditionality, not merely an administrative byproduct of the plea documents.