Background
Patrice M. Brown sought workers’ compensation benefits from the City of Cleveland after a workplace injury and later sought an additional allowance for a spinal injury. After the Industrial Commission denied the additional claim in November 2022, Brown timely appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. She voluntarily dismissed that action and refiled it within one year.
The trial court later dismissed the refiled action without prejudice after Brown did not attend a deposition and final pretrial. Brown filed the present, third complaint within one year of that dismissal. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and Cleveland moved to dismiss, contending that Brown had already used Ohio’s saving statute and could not use it again after the limitations period expired. The trial court granted the motions for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court’s Holding
The Eighth District reversed and remanded. Applying the Ohio Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A., the court held that R.C. 2305.19 does not impose a one-use limit on Ohio’s saving statute.
Brown timely commenced her original action, refiled within one year after her voluntary dismissal, and filed the third action within one year after the second action was dismissed without prejudice. Because the parties did not dispute that those dismissals were otherwise than on the merits or that Brown met the statute’s timing requirements, the trial court erred in dismissing the third complaint.
Key Takeaways
- Ohio’s saving statute does not limit a plaintiff to one refiling.
- A plaintiff may commence another action within one year after a prior action fails otherwise than on the merits, provided the statute’s requirements are met.
- Potentially abusive repeat filings remain subject to remedies available under Civ.R. 41.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the Ohio Supreme Court’s clarification that R.C. 2305.19 permits successive refilings after qualifying nonmerits dismissals. The expiration of the original limitations period does not independently bar a later action commenced within the saving statute’s one-year period.