Background
Andy Phu signed a residential solar-panel installation contract with Complete Solar, Inc. in September 2022. He later alleged that the panels were installed incorrectly by a subcontractor, that they failed his city utility’s inspection at least six times, and that he was denied a permit to operate them—all while he was required to keep making payments on his installation loan. Phu sued Complete Solar, its CEO T.J. Rodgers, and former COO Brian Wuebbels, along with several other parties, asserting violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), common-law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. He also sought a declaration that the Solar Contract was “null and void” and requested treble and exemplary damages.
The Solar Contract contained an arbitration clause (initialed by Phu) requiring the parties to submit disputes first to mediation and then, if unresolved, to binding arbitration governed by the Texas Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. Complete Solar answered the lawsuit in September 2024 but did not move to compel arbitration until nine months later, in June 2025. The trial court denied the motion, signing a written order in November 2025, concluding that the mediation condition precedent had not been met and that Complete Solar had waived its right to arbitrate by substantially invoking the judicial process. The appeal followed.
Before the merits, appellee Phu argued the court lacked jurisdiction, pointing to two handwritten docket-sheet entries the trial judge made in July and October 2025 as appealable orders from which the 20-day clock had already run. The Eighth Court of Appeals addressed that threshold issue before turning to the substantive questions.
The Court’s Holding
The court reversed the trial court’s denial and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration, resolving four distinct legal issues.
First, on timeliness, the court held that docket-sheet entries—even detailed handwritten entries stating “motion denied”—are not signed written orders and cannot substitute for them. Only the November 20, 2025 signed order was an appealable ruling. Because Complete Solar filed its notice of appeal 18 days later, the appeal was timely. See Garza v. Texas Alcoholic Bev. Comm’n, 89 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2002) (signed judgment prevails over conflicting docket-sheet entry).
Second, on fraudulent inducement, the court applied the well-settled distinction between challenges aimed at the arbitration clause specifically—which courts decide—and challenges aimed at the underlying contract as a whole—which must go to the arbitrator. Because Phu’s fraud allegations concerned alleged misrepresentations about the installation process, not any misrepresentation about the arbitration clause itself, the question belonged to the arbitrator. In re Labatt Food Serv., 279 S.W.3d 640, 647–48 (Tex. App. 2009); TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. 2023).
Third, on the mediation condition precedent, the court found it satisfied. After the trial court’s bench ruling but before it signed the formal written order, the parties participated in an unsuccessful mediation in November 2025. That mediation fulfilled the contractual requirement and removed any procedural bar to compelling arbitration. Fourth, the court found no waiver by litigation conduct, noting that the limited discovery exchange and nine-month gap before moving to compel did not constitute the kind of substantial invocation of the judicial process, to the opponent’s detriment, required to forfeit the right to arbitrate. Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008).
Key Takeaways
- A trial court’s handwritten docket entry does not trigger the 20-day deadline for an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration; only a signed written order starts the clock under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b).
- A fraudulent-inducement defense fails to defeat an arbitration clause when it is directed at the underlying contract as a whole, not at the arbitration clause specifically—that defense goes to the arbitrator under both the TAA and the FAA.
- A mediation condition precedent in an arbitration clause can be satisfied after the lawsuit is filed: if the parties conduct mediation before the trial court signs a written denial order, the condition is met and the court must enforce the arbitration agreement.
Why It Matters
For Texas businesses and their counsel, Complete Solar v. Phu provides important procedural and substantive guideposts for enforcing arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Practitioners drafting residential service agreements—particularly in the solar and home-improvement sectors—should understand that a mediation-first clause is a condition precedent to arbitration that courts take seriously, but that the condition can be cured post-filing. Defendants who miss an early opportunity to move to compel should not assume they have permanently waived the right; waiver by litigation conduct requires both substantial invocation of the judicial process and demonstrable prejudice to the other party—a high bar for standard pre-answer and early-discovery activity.
The opinion also reaffirms the scope of the contract-versus-arbitration-clause distinction that regularly recurs in DTPA and consumer-fraud cases. Plaintiffs frequently argue that alleged misrepresentations in the sales process vitiate the entire contract, including its arbitration clause. Complete Solar confirms that this argument belongs in the arbitral forum, not the trial court, unless the fraud is directed specifically at the agreement to arbitrate. That means most residential consumer-contract disputes will proceed to arbitration even when the plaintiff alleges that the entire transaction was fraudulent.