Background
F.M.W., born in 2017, is the biological child of Father, who signed the birth certificate. After Father was incarcerated, F.M.W.’s maternal grandmother obtained legal custody of the child in January 2025 through the Montgomery County Juvenile Division. In July 2025, Grandmother filed a petition in probate court to adopt F.M.W. The biological mother consented to the adoption. The probate court served Father with the mandatory statutory notice at the state prison facility where he was held, and a return receipt was filed confirming delivery on July 16, 2025.
The notice, in boldface capital letters as required by R.C. 3107.11(B), warned Father that a final decree of adoption would terminate his parental rights and that, because F.M.W. was older than one year, he was required to file a written objection within 28 days of service and appear at the hearing. The notice also advised Father of his right to appointed counsel and how to request it. Father did not file a written objection, did not request an attorney, and did not appear at the December 5, 2025 hearing. The probate court entered a final decree of adoption that day, finding that Father’s consent was not required due to his failure to object. Father filed a handwritten objection letter on December 24, 2025 — nearly five months after service — and then filed this appeal on January 5, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The Second Appellate District affirmed the probate court’s judgment in full. Under R.C. 3107.07(I), a parent’s consent to adoption is not required when that parent receives proper statutory notice of the adoption petition and fails to comply with the objection procedures set forth in that notice. The court found that Father received notice fully compliant with R.C. 3107.11(B), was personally served while incarcerated, and nonetheless failed to file any written objection within the 28-day period or appear at the hearing. His handwritten letter filed after the final decree was entered came far too late to preserve any objection rights.
The court reaffirmed that the rule applies regardless of whether a parent is characterized as a “putative father” or a “biological parent who signed the birth certificate,” citing uniform holdings from multiple Ohio appellate districts. Quoting the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in In re Zschach, 75 Ohio St.3d 648 (1996), the court acknowledged that strict adherence to R.C. 3107.07’s procedural mandates “might appear unfair in a given case,” but held that the state’s interest in facilitating adoption and achieving finality in adoption proceedings “justifies such a rigid application.”
Key Takeaways
- Under R.C. 3107.07(I), a biological father who receives proper statutory notice of an adoption petition forfeits his right to withhold consent — and his right to contest the adoption — if he fails to file a written objection within 28 days (for a child one year or older) and appear at the hearing.
- Incarceration does not excuse a parent from complying with Ohio’s adoption-objection procedures; the obligation to act runs from confirmed service of notice, not from release or actual attendance at the hearing.
- A post-decree handwritten letter objecting to the adoption is insufficient to preserve parental rights; the statutory deadline is strictly enforced even when the outcome may seem harsh to the individual parent.
- The notice sent by the clerk must include the boldface, all-capitals language prescribed by R.C. 3107.11(B), and must also inform the parent of the right to appointed counsel — both of which were satisfied here.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces what Ohio courts have consistently held across multiple districts: the procedural requirements to object to an adoption petition are not merely technical formalities — they are jurisdictional prerequisites for a biological parent to retain consent rights. Attorneys representing incarcerated parents must move immediately upon any notice of an adoption filing to preserve the client’s rights, since neither incarceration, absence from the hearing, nor a belated written objection will rescue a parent who missed the statutory window.
The case also illustrates the tension built into Ohio adoption law between the fundamental constitutional dimensions of parental rights — recognized by both the U.S. and Ohio Supreme Courts — and the state’s equally strong interest in achieving prompt finality for children awaiting permanency. Ohio’s statutory scheme resolves that tension decisively in favor of finality once proper notice has been given and the parent has failed to act.