Background
Wendee and Robert Lester were married in 2010 and resided in Franklin County from 2013 until June 2024, when they relocated to Perry County. On April 1, 2025, Wendee filed a divorce complaint in Franklin County, alleging that Robert conducted activity there giving rise to the claim, that the claim arose there, and that Robert’s principal place of business was located there. She requested service on April 3, 2025 and initiated certified mail service on April 8, 2025.
Before Wendee perfected service, Robert filed his own divorce complaint in Perry County on April 7, 2025. The Perry County court denied Wendee’s motion to dismiss, ruling that Franklin County was improper venue because Wendee had not resided there for the 90 days preceding her complaint, as required by Ohio Civil Rule 3(C)(9). Robert then moved to dismiss the Franklin County action for improper venue. The Franklin County trial court granted the motion, holding that Civ.R. 3(C)(9)—the 90-day residency requirement—was “controlling” in divorce actions and that both parties now satisfied the Perry County residency requirement.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court reversed and remanded. The court held that Civ.R. 3(C)(9) is not exclusive or controlling in divorce actions. Rather, all ten subsections of Civ.R. 3(C) have equal status, and a plaintiff may choose among them with unrestricted discretion. The court reaffirmed its prior precedent in Fuller v. Fuller (1972), which established that subsection (9) coexists with other venue provisions and does not limit them.
Because Wendee had alleged proper venue under Civ.R. 3(C)(2) (defendant’s principal place of business), (3) (defendant conducted activity there), and (6) (claim arose there), and provided documentation in support, the trial court erred by focusing solely on subsection (9) and dismissing the action. On remand, if Franklin County is proper venue under any of these subsections, the jurisdictional-priority rule requires the case to proceed there, since Wendee filed first and perfected service first. If venue is improper under all subsections, the remedy is transfer to a proper county, not dismissal.
Key Takeaways
- Civ.R. 3(C)(9)’s 90-day residency requirement for divorce does not exclude alternative venue bases in the same rule.
- Plaintiffs may choose among multiple proper venue provisions; all subsections of Civ.R. 3(C) carry equal weight.
- When improper venue is alleged, the proper remedy under Civ.R. 3(D) is transfer, not dismissal.
- The jurisdictional-priority rule applies when a plaintiff files and obtains service first, granting exclusive jurisdiction to that court.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies a critical ambiguity in Ohio family law: whether the specific 90-day residency requirement for divorce implicitly limits venue to that provision alone. By reaffirming that divorce venue provisions coexist and afford plaintiffs discretion, the court protects plaintiffs’ procedural rights and prevents defendants from collapsing multiple legitimate venue bases into a single, more restrictive test. The decision also reinforces the jurisdictional-priority rule’s role in preventing duplicative litigation when parties file competing divorce complaints in different counties.
For Ohio practitioners, this holding means that in contested divorce venue disputes, plaintiffs should affirmatively plead all available venue bases—not just subsection (9)—and that courts must evaluate each alleged basis before dismissing. The distinction between transfer and dismissal as remedies is equally important, as improper venue does not destroy jurisdiction; it merely requires relocation of the action.