Background
Shannon Mattox underwent a robotic hysterectomy and bilateral salpingectomy performed by Dr. Natalya Dubchuk at Southwest General Health Center. Mattox had signed consent forms for a robotic hysterectomy, salpingectomy, and morcellation, a technique for removing uterine tissue through small abdominal incisions. During surgery, Dubchuk determined that Mattox’s uterus could instead be removed vaginally and did not use morcellation.
Mattox later experienced pelvic pain and sued Dubchuk and Southwest for medical negligence and failure to obtain informed consent. She alleged that she had agreed to abdominal morcellation and had not agreed to vaginal removal. Before trial, the common pleas court ruled that the complaint pleaded negligence and informed consent, but not a separate medical-battery claim. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, including findings that Mattox’s written informed consent was valid and that she had not proved inadequate informed consent.
The Court’s Holding
The Eighth District affirmed. It held that even assuming the trial court erred by using a motion in limine to exclude a medical-battery theory, any error was harmless. Mattox had presented the evidence she said supported battery, but the jury rejected her informed-consent claim; therefore, the appellate court concluded the jury could not have found the more fundamental absence of consent required for medical battery.
The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mattox’s post-evidence request to amend the pleadings under Civil Rule 15(B). Evidence about the scope of Mattox’s consent was relevant to her pleaded informed-consent claim, and the defendants’ failure to object to that evidence did not establish implied consent to try an unpleaded battery claim. Mattox also failed to identify a specific ruling concerning Ohio Revised Code 2317.54, and she waived objections to the interrogatories by not objecting when the court discussed and corrected them.
Key Takeaways
- Medical battery and lack of informed consent are distinct Ohio claims: battery requires an intentional, unconsented-to touching.
- Evidence relevant to an existing informed-consent claim does not, by itself, show implied consent to try an unpleaded battery claim under Civil Rule 15(B).
- A party must timely object to jury interrogatories and identify the challenged ruling in the appellate record.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the importance of expressly pleading a medical-battery theory when a patient contends that a procedure exceeded the scope of consent. Allegations concerning consent may overlap with informed-consent evidence, but that overlap will not necessarily preserve a separate unpleaded intentional-tort claim.