Background
Crystal L. Kindred pleaded guilty to five counts of receiving stolen property, one count of safecracking, one count of possessing criminal tools, two counts of burglary, and one count of tampering with evidence. A firearm specification was dismissed, while vehicle and cellphone forfeiture specifications remained.
The Licking County Common Pleas Court imposed an aggregate prison term of four years and nine months by ordering certain terms to run consecutively. Kindred did not object at sentencing, but she appealed, arguing that the court failed to make the findings required by Ohio law for consecutive sentences and that its findings lacked record support.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth District held that the trial court failed to make all findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), both at the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing entry. That provision requires findings that at least two offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct and that the resulting harm was so great or unusual that no single prison term adequately reflects the seriousness of the conduct.
The trial court stated that a single sentence would not adequately reflect the seriousness of Kindred’s conduct, but it did not find that multiple offenses were committed as part of a course of conduct. The appellate court found plain error, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. It sustained Kindred’s first assignment of error and deemed her challenge to the evidentiary support for the findings premature.
Key Takeaways
- A court imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) must make both conjunctive findings required by that subsection.
- The required consecutive-sentence findings must be made at the sentencing hearing and incorporated into the sentencing entry.
- An incomplete sentencing entry supported plain-error relief even though Kindred did not object when the sentence was announced.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that a trial court’s substantial compliance with Ohio’s consecutive-sentencing statute is not enough when a required statutory finding is omitted. A generalized statement that one sentence would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct does not replace the separate course-of-conduct finding.
Judge Gormley concurred in the judgment separately, emphasizing that the defective written sentencing entry distinguished this case from one in which complete findings appeared in the entry despite omissions during the hearing.