Background
Telhio Credit Union sued Tierra Byrd in December 2015 for breach of a loan agreement covering the purchase of a 2008 Jeep Liberty, seeking $8,346.67. Default judgment was entered in July 2016 when Byrd failed to answer.
In December 2022—over six years later—Byrd moved to vacate the judgment, arguing she was never properly served because the summons was sent to the wrong address. She presented documentary evidence (utility bills) proving she lived elsewhere. The trial court granted the motion in March 2023. Telhio then re-served Byrd, who answered in June 2023, raising defenses including statute of limitations and alleging Telhio violated consumer protection statutes (Truth in Lending Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act).
The trial court granted Telhio’s motion for summary judgment on April 18, 2024, finding the statute of limitations had not run. Nearly a year later, on April 3, 2025, Byrd filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, repeating her consumer protection claims and adding allegations of miscalculated deficiency and illegal repossession. The trial court denied the motion on May 8, 2025. Byrd appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the merits. The court held that a motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) is not a substitute for a direct appeal and cannot be used to circumvent appellate deadlines.
The summary judgment order was a final appealable order. Under Ohio App.R. 4(A)(1), Byrd had 30 days from entry of summary judgment to file a notice of appeal. She did not. Instead, she waited eleven months to file a Civ.R. 60(B) motion arguing the summary judgment was wrong—essentially trying indirectly what she could not do directly. Because Byrd’s assignments of error challenged the summary judgment itself (not the trial court’s denial of relief), the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to address her arguments.
The court cited Suon v. Mong (2018-Ohio-4187) and other precedent for the principle that appellate courts will not “do indirectly what it cannot do directly” and that a motion for relief cannot serve as a substitute appeal on the merits.
Key Takeaways
- The 30-day appellate filing deadline is strict and jurisdictional; missing it cannot be cured by filing a Civ.R. 60(B) motion later.
- A Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment is a remedy for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct—not a vehicle to appeal adverse rulings on the merits.
- Appellants must appeal final orders directly within the statutory period; procedural shortcuts will not be tolerated.
- The trial court’s decision to re-enter judgment after vacating the original default was not disturbed, as Byrd had not appealed the summary judgment within 30 days.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Ohio’s strict appellate rules and the critical importance of procedural compliance. For plaintiff’s counsel in debt collection cases, the ruling confirms that once a judgment is properly final—whether by default or summary judgment—the defendant must appeal within 30 days or lose appellate review of the merits. Byrd’s defenses (statute of limitations, improper service, consumer protection violations) may have had merit, but her procedural misstep eliminated any opportunity to raise them on appeal.
For defense counsel, the case is a cautionary tale: even potentially meritorious arguments are forfeited by missing the appellate deadline. Filing a motion for relief from judgment is not a substitute and will not revive jurisdiction over claims that should have been appealed directly. The decision also highlights that vacating a default judgment for improper service does not automatically reset the clock for appeal deadlines on subsequent judgments—each judgment requires its own timely appeal.
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