Background
After another Facebook user warned that registered sex offender William Sheets was seeking work at local horse farms, Taniya Avena commented that his registered “current work location” came back to Watson Horse Farms. Aria and Bill Watson testified that Sheets worked for a separate business operating at the same address, had never worked for Watson Horse Farms, and had never entered its horse barn. The Watsons sued Avena for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Avena sought expedited dismissal under Ohio’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, which provides early review of certain claims arising from protected public expression. The trial court held that the Act applied and no statutory exception did, dismissed the emotional-distress claim, but allowed the defamation claim to proceed because the Watsons had established a prima facie case. Avena appealed the refusal to dismiss that claim.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth District affirmed. Applying de novo review, it held that the trial court properly considered testimony from the preliminary-injunction hearing because Ohio’s UPEPA permits consideration of evidence that would be admissible in summary-judgment proceedings, including transcripts of evidence. The missing transcript from the separate UPEPA hearing also required the appellate court to presume regularity in those proceedings.
Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the Watsons’ favor, the court held that they produced prima facie evidence of falsity. A reasonable reader could understand Avena’s comment to mean that Sheets worked for Watson Horse Farms itself—not merely that his employer shared the farm’s address. Testimony that multiple businesses used the address and that Sheets had no connection to the horse farm also created a factual dispute over Avena’s substantial-truth defense.
The Watsons also offered sufficient evidence of fault and damages. Their testimony that Avena did not attempt to verify Sheets’s connection to the farm could support a negligence finding, while evidence that two long-term horse-boarders left immediately after the posts could support special damages for defamation per quod. The court emphasized that the UPEPA prima facie inquiry is a low threshold and does not permit weighing competing evidence or finally resolving defenses.
Key Takeaways
- Ohio courts reviewing UPEPA motions may consider preliminary-injunction testimony when it qualifies as summary-judgment evidence.
- A statement linking a person to a named business may be materially false even when the person’s actual employer shares that business’s address.
- Evidence of inadequate verification and identifiable lost customers can establish prima facie fault and special damages at the UPEPA stage.
Why It Matters
The decision explains how Ohio courts should analyze expedited dismissal motions under the state’s relatively new UPEPA framework. Although the Act protects speech on matters of public concern, it does not require dismissal when the plaintiff presents some competent evidence supporting every element of a defamation claim and factual disputes remain over falsity, fault, damages, or substantial truth.