Background
The Muscogee (Creek) Nation filed suit in federal court against the City of Tulsa seeking to enjoin Tulsa’s municipal prosecution of Indians within its city limits for conduct occurring on the Nation’s reservation. The case raised the question of whether Tulsa possesses criminal jurisdiction over tribal members in that territory. While the federal litigation was pending, Tulsa’s Mayor Monroe Nichols IV negotiated and signed a Joint Settlement Agreement with the Nation on June 25, 2025. Under that agreement, Tulsa committed not to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants on the Nation’s reservation, to dismiss with prejudice all pending municipal prosecutions against Indian defendants, and to refrain from initiating future such prosecutions.
Governor Kevin Stitt sought to intervene in the federal case to challenge the settlement, but the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied intervention, concluding that the legality of the agreement under Oklahoma law was a state-court matter. The federal court also declined to approve the settlement, and the parties ultimately filed a stipulation of dismissal, ending the federal litigation. Oklahoma Governor Stitt then filed this original-jurisdiction action in the Oklahoma Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus or prohibition and declaratory relief to have the Settlement Agreement declared invalid.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court had previously stayed the proceeding while the federal litigation was ongoing. After the Northern District case concluded, the Court lifted the stay, assumed original jurisdiction under the publici juris doctrine given the significant public interest, and took up the single dispositive question of whether Tulsa lawfully entered into the Settlement Agreement.
The Court’s Holding
The Court held that the Settlement Agreement is invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law because Tulsa failed to obtain the mandatory statutory approvals required by 74 O.S. 2021, § 1221(D)(1). That provision authorizes political subdivisions to negotiate intergovernmental cooperative agreements with federally recognized Indian tribes, but expressly conditions their effectiveness on approval by both the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the Governor. Neither body approved the Settlement Agreement before Tulsa executed it.
The Court rejected Tulsa’s argument that the Settlement Agreement was merely an extension of a pre-existing 2006 Intergovernmental Cross-Deputization Agreement that had already been properly authorized. Examining the plain language of both instruments, the Court found that the Settlement Agreement introduces distinct obligations—most significantly, a wholesale surrender of Tulsa’s prosecutorial authority over tribal members on the reservation—that go far beyond anything in the Cross-Deputization Agreement. The 2006 agreement addressed law enforcement services and left prosecutorial jurisdiction to be determined among multiple governmental actors; the Settlement Agreement categorically eliminated Tulsa’s municipal prosecution authority. The Court further noted that even if the Settlement Agreement were treated as an amendment to the Cross-Deputization Agreement, it was not executed by all required parties as that agreement’s own amendment procedures demanded.
The Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling Tulsa to seek the required statutory approvals from both the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the Governor if it wishes to proceed with the agreement, and granted declaratory relief confirming the agreement’s invalidity until such approvals are obtained.
Key Takeaways
- Oklahoma cities and other political subdivisions cannot enter binding intergovernmental cooperative agreements with federally recognized Indian tribes without approval from both the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the Governor under 74 O.S. § 1221(D)(1); an agreement executed without those approvals is void and unenforceable.
- Courts will look to the substance and purpose of an agreement—not merely its label—to determine whether it constitutes an independent intergovernmental cooperative agreement requiring statutory approval; an agreement that introduces materially new obligations will not be treated as a simple extension of a prior authorized agreement.
- The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s publici juris doctrine permits assumption of original jurisdiction when a dispute involves significant public interest requiring urgent resolution, as confirmed here where the criminal statute of limitations would run and investigative opportunities would erode while the agreement’s validity remained unsettled.
- A municipality’s agreement to surrender prosecutorial authority over an entire class of defendants is a consequential act of governance subject to state legislative oversight, not an administrative matter within the mayor’s unilateral power.
Why It Matters
This decision carries broad implications for local governments across the eastern half of Oklahoma, where much of the land falls within the boundaries of tribal reservations recognized or reaffirmed following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma. Cities and counties in that region have been navigating complex and unsettled questions about the scope of their criminal jurisdiction over tribal members, and some have sought negotiated resolutions with tribes. This ruling makes clear that any such resolution—however reasonable or practically motivated—must run through the state’s formal approval process, giving both the Governor and the Legislature’s Joint Committee a veto over local agreements with tribes on criminal jurisdiction.
The decision also illustrates the tension between local governmental flexibility and state oversight in the post-McGirt landscape. Tulsa entered the settlement to resolve live federal litigation and achieve workable law enforcement arrangements; the Court nonetheless invalidated it on procedural grounds while expressly leaving open the possibility that a compliant agreement could be resubmitted for approval. Chief Justice Rowe’s concurrence signals a potential future challenge, as she reiterated her view that the Joint Committee approval requirement may itself be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority—an issue the majority did not reach.