Background
Tennisha Bourne was convicted in Linn County Circuit Court on one count of second-degree murder under ORS 163.115, as an accomplice to a shooting that killed the victim, C, with whom she had a prior romantic relationship. A co-actor, R — the father of Bourne’s child — fired a gun through the wall and window of C’s home. The conspiracy count merged into the murder conviction at sentencing.
The state’s theory was accomplice liability under ORS 161.155(2)(b), which imposes criminal liability on a person who, with intent to promote or facilitate a crime, aids or abets the principal in planning or committing it. The state presented evidence that Bourne falsely told R that C was sexually abusing their child, causing R to travel from out of town; that she directed R to C’s home; that she concealed her identity from security cameras at the scene; and that she pointed out C’s window to R while R was holding a gun. Bourne also made incriminating statements about her role in planning and carrying out the shooting.
Bourne appealed, raising two assignments of error: that the trial court wrongly denied her motions for judgment of acquittal on both the murder and conspiracy charges. The state responded that the murder assignment was unpreserved and that sufficient evidence supported both convictions.
The Court’s Holding
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a per curiam nonprecedential memorandum opinion. The court declined to resolve the preservation question on the murder assignment, finding it unnecessary because neither assignment provided a basis for relief regardless. Applying the standard that requires viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, the court asked whether a rational trier of fact, drawing reasonable inferences, could find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Hedgpeth, 365 Or 724, 730 (2019).
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support Bourne’s conviction as an accomplice to second-degree murder. It found that her conduct went well beyond “mere presence” — the baseline that Oregon law recognizes as insufficient for accomplice liability. By fabricating allegations of child abuse to motivate R, traveling with him to the scene, concealing her identity from cameras, and pointing out the victim’s window while R held a gun, Bourne provided the “act shown to have been done by the accomplice” that Oregon law requires. Her own inculpatory statements further supported the jury’s finding of intent to promote or facilitate the murder.
Because the conspiracy count had merged into the murder conviction, the court declined to separately address the denial of the acquittal motion on that charge, rendering the second assignment of error moot.
Key Takeaways
- Oregon accomplice liability requires more than mere presence but is satisfied by even a minimal degree of concert or collusion; pointing out a victim’s location to an armed principal while concealing one’s own identity readily clears that bar.
- Courts reviewing denial of a judgment of acquittal view all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the state — a standard that proved fatal to Bourne’s challenge given the breadth of evidence against her.
- When a lesser charge merges into a greater conviction at sentencing, an appellate challenge to the lesser charge becomes moot and the court need not reach it.
- This opinion is nonprecedential under ORAP 10.30 and may be cited only as that rule permits.
Why It Matters
The case illustrates how Oregon courts apply accomplice liability where a defendant orchestrates a violent act without personally pulling the trigger. Bourne’s conviction rested entirely on her conduct before and during the shooting — fabricating a pretext, guiding the shooter to the scene, and identifying the target — none of which required her to be the one who fired. Practitioners handling accomplice cases should note that the “least degree of concert or collusion” standard is unforgiving: active facilitation of even a single element of the crime can be enough.
Although the opinion is nonprecedential, it offers a concrete fact pattern against which defense counsel can measure the sufficiency of the state’s evidence in similar cases, particularly where the defendant argues that incriminating conduct was ambiguous or that no affirmative act was proved.