Background
After T disclosed numerous incidents in which James Paul Chasteen had sexually abused her as a child, the state indicted Chasteen on 18 felony counts. A jury convicted him of 11 offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to a total of 300 months in prison.
Chasteen raised six assignments of error on appeal. He challenged testimony from a jailhouse informant, evidence of an uncharged incident involving T, admission of T’s hearsay statements, and rulings concerning the indictment’s allegation that the offenses occurred “on or about” specified dates.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the jailhouse informant’s testimony because the record supported the finding that the informant acted on his own rather than as a state agent under either the Oregon or federal constitution. It also upheld admission of the uncharged “truck incident,” concluding that the evidence was relevant for nonpropensity purposes—showing Chasteen’s sexual predisposition toward the particular victim and explaining her delayed reporting—and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under OEC 403.
The court rejected the hearsay challenge as foreclosed by existing precedent. It also found no error in the rulings concerning the charged dates: Chasteen’s proposed one-week instruction was not necessary to his defense theory; the instruction actually given did not amend the indictment or misstate the state’s burden; and the court permissibly prevented defense counsel from defining “on or about” during closing argument because instructing the jury on the law is the court’s role.
Key Takeaways
- A jailhouse informant is not a state agent merely because the informant later cooperates with authorities; the inquiry turns on whether the state sufficiently guided, encouraged, or supported the information-gathering activity.
- Evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct involving the same child victim may be admissible for nonpropensity purposes, including showing a sexual predisposition toward that particular victim and explaining delayed reporting.
- A defendant is not entitled to a requested date-variance instruction unless it is legally correct, supported by the record, and necessary to a theory not otherwise covered by the instructions.
- Counsel may argue how the evidence applies to the governing legal standard but may not supply a legal definition that the court did not give the jury.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates how Oregon courts distinguish independent informant activity from constitutionally attributable state conduct and how same-victim other-acts evidence may survive OEC 403 review when it supports noncharacter inferences.
It also underscores the limits on defense efforts to narrow an indictment’s “on or about” allegations through jury instructions or closing argument. The opinion is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion under ORAP 10.30 and may be cited only as that rule permits.