Background
William Christopher Davis was arrested in March 2019 and charged with second-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and third-degree robbery. He remained in custody throughout his case, which was not resolved until March 2022—nearly three years after arrest. On appeal from his conviction, Davis argued that the three-year delay violated his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights under Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 136.290 and 136.295, as well as the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions.
At trial-level proceedings, Davis’s defense counsel repeatedly requested continuances and setovers. At a May 3, 2019 hearing—within 60 days of arrest—counsel asked for a continuance to June 7, 2019 and confirmed with the court that the 60-day deadline had not yet begun, while Davis remained silent. Over the following months, defense counsel agreed to multiple extensions. On January 13, 2020, the trial court asked Davis directly whether he was waiving the 60-day deadline; Davis answered “Yeah.” Despite these waivers, Davis filed a pro se motion for release on January 27, 2020, claiming speedy trial violations. The case eventually proceeded to trial scheduled for April 11, 2022, but Davis entered a conditional no-contest plea on March 15, 2022, before the court ruled on his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The court held that Davis waived his statutory speedy trial rights under ORS 136.290 through multiple avenues: (1) by remaining silent when his defense counsel agreed to trial dates extending beyond the 60-day deadline; (2) by silent acquiescence during hearings where continuances were discussed; and (3) through explicit on-the-record waiver on January 13, 2020, when Davis answered affirmatively that he was waiving the 60-day requirement.
The court noted that a defendant may waive the 60-day requirement by remaining silent when counsel agree to trial dates that transgress it, citing State v. Becker. Because the record showed defense counsel requested setovers at multiple points—May 3, June 6, September and October 2019—and Davis never objected or protested, the court found sufficient evidence of waiver. The court also distinguished between the statutory speedy trial claims (which could be waived) and Davis’s constitutional speedy trial arguments (which could not be reviewed because Davis entered a plea before the court ruled on his motion to dismiss and thus never received a judicial ruling on the constitutional claim).
Key Takeaways
- Defendants can waive statutory speedy trial rights through silence when counsel agrees to extending trial dates beyond statutory deadlines.
- An explicit, on-the-record waiver—such as Davis’s “Yeah” response to the court’s direct question—constitutes clear waiver of speedy trial protections.
- Defense counsel’s actions and agreements to continuances can bind a defendant to waiver of statutory rights, particularly when the defendant remains silent and does not object.
- Constitutional speedy trial claims require a trial court ruling before plea to preserve the issue for appellate review; failure to secure a ruling before pleading forecloses appeal on that ground.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies that defendants do not automatically receive speedy trial protection if they or their counsel fail to assert it. Even where there is an undisputed three-year delay in custody, courts will enforce waiver through silence and explicit agreement, especially when counsel actively negotiates continuances. Defense practitioners must be alert to the distinction between statutory speedy trial rights (which can be waived) and constitutional claims (which require preservation through a trial court ruling).
The opinion reinforces the principle that defendants cannot passively allow continuances to mount and then claim surprise at speedy trial violations. It also serves as a cautionary note that entering a conditional plea before the court has ruled on a speedy trial motion can forfeit appellate review of constitutional speedy trial claims entirely. For prosecutors, the decision validates courts’ ability to honor stipulated trial setups even when they result in extended pre-trial detention, provided the defendant has assented to the delays.