Background
Feliciti Margaret Mullins Guthrie was convicted of harassment under ORS 166.065 and driving under the influence of intoxicants under ORS 813.010.
The judgment stated that the court could increase the total amount owed by adding “collection fees and other assessments,” without further notice to Guthrie or another court order. On appeal, Guthrie challenged only the language authorizing “other assessments.” She acknowledged that ORS 1.202 permits collection fees but argued that it does not authorize other assessments.
The Court’s Holding
The Oregon Court of Appeals accepted the state’s concession that the trial court lacked statutory authority to include language allowing “other assessments” to be added for the first time in the judgment. The court relied on State v. Martinez, 347 Or App 273, 279, 587 P3d 428 (2026).
The court reversed the portion of the judgment concerning additional assessments and remanded for entry of an amended judgment deleting the phrases “and other assessments” and “and assessments.” It otherwise affirmed the judgment.
Key Takeaways
- ORS 1.202 permits collection fees but did not authorize the judgment’s provision for unspecified “other assessments.”
- A trial court may not impose unauthorized monetary terms for the first time in a criminal judgment.
- Because the error was confined to the judgment language, the proper remedy was a limited remand to delete the unauthorized terms.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that monetary obligations in criminal judgments must have statutory authorization. Boilerplate language permitting future assessments cannot expand a court’s authority beyond what the legislature has provided.
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion under ORAP 10.30 and may be cited only as permitted by ORAP 10.30(1).