Background
Manuel Alejandro Saravia was charged with first-degree sexual abuse based on allegations that he subjected two girls under age 14 to sexual contact. The state presented evidence that he touched one girl’s chest, tried to remove her pants, and kissed her on the lips, and that he touched the other girl’s buttocks and vaginal area over her clothing.
Saravia asked the trial court to instruct the jury that a body part is “intimate” only if the person touched regarded it as intimate and the defendant knew that the person regarded it that way. The court declined and instead instructed that a body part is intimate if the person regards it as intimate and either the defendant knows that or any reasonable person would know the part is intimate. After his conviction, Saravia appealed the refusal to give his proposed instruction.
The Court’s Holding
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Saravia’s proposed instruction conflicted with the Oregon Supreme Court’s definition in State v. Woodley. Under Woodley, body parts other than those deemed sexual or intimate as a matter of law may qualify as intimate when they are subjectively intimate to the person touched and either the accused knows that or the area would objectively be known as intimate to any reasonable person.
The court rejected Saravia’s argument that State v. Simonov had abrogated Woodley. Simonov addressed the minimum culpable mental state applicable to an element of unlawful use of a vehicle, whereas Woodley defined the nature of the “intimate parts” element itself. Because Simonov neither discussed nor undermined Woodley, the Court of Appeals remained bound by Woodley and concluded that the trial court correctly rejected Saravia’s narrower instruction.
Key Takeaways
- Woodley’s subjective-or-objective framework for determining whether a body part is “intimate” remains binding Oregon law.
- The state need not always prove that a defendant actually knew the person touched regarded the body part as intimate; objective knowledge attributable to a reasonable person may satisfy Woodley’s definition.
- Cases addressing the culpable mental state attached to an element do not necessarily alter precedent defining the substantive nature of that element.
Why It Matters
The decision preserves the existing Oregon jury-instruction framework for deciding whether a body part constitutes an “intimate part” in sexual-abuse prosecutions. Defendants cannot use later culpable-mental-state decisions to eliminate Woodley’s objective reasonable-person alternative.
The opinion is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion under ORAP 10.30 and may be cited only as that rule permits.