Background
Thomas Bennett served Falls Township as zoning officer, chief code-enforcement officer, and floodplain administrator. His amended complaint alleged that Township Supervisor Jeff Dence intervened in a certificate-of-occupancy dispute involving a family friend. Township inspectors had identified safety problems at the property, including pool barriers, carbon-monoxide alarms, and electrical protections. Bennett alleged that Dence pressed officials to approve occupancy despite those unresolved concerns.
According to Bennett, township management then stripped him of practical authority, directed other code officers not to follow him, and ultimately ended his employment. He sued Dence for intentional interference with his employment contract, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Bennett alleged that Dence acted to advance a personal relationship rather than a municipal purpose and therefore acted outside the scope of his office.
The Bucks County Court of Common Pleas entered judgment on the pleadings for Dence. It applied the six-month period in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(b)(1) for certain actions against government officers and concluded that Bennett sued too late. Bennett argued that intentional interference has its own two-year limitations period under Section 5524(3), and that disputed allegations about Dence’s personal purpose could not be resolved from the pleadings.
The Court’s Holding
The Commonwealth Court reversed in an unreported memorandum by Senior Judge Leavitt. Section 5522(b)(1) provides a six-month period only for actions against a government officer that are “not otherwise provided for” by another limitations rule. Intentional interference with a contractual relationship is expressly governed by Section 5524(3)’s two-year period. Because Bennett filed within two years of his discharge, the six-month provision did not bar the claim.
The pleadings also did not establish that Dence acted within the scope of his office. Pennsylvania’s scope-of-employment test asks whether the conduct was of the kind the employee was hired to perform, occurred substantially within authorized time and space, and was motivated at least partly by a purpose to serve the employer. Bennett alleged instead that Dence meddled in code enforcement for personal objectives involving a family friend. Accepted as true at the pleadings stage, those allegations described ultra vires conduct—action beyond lawful authority—rather than municipal work.
The court emphasized that it was not deciding whether Bennett could prove his account. Dence disputed the allegations, and those factual conflicts were precisely why judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate. The case returned to the trial court for further proceedings on the tortious-interference claim.
Key Takeaways
- The six-month limitations period for claims against government officers yields when a more specific statute supplies another period.
- Intentional interference with a contractual relationship carries Pennsylvania’s two-year tort limitations period.
- Allegations that an official used public position for personal objectives can place the conduct outside the scope of employment.
- Disputed facts about purpose and authority ordinarily cannot be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Why It Matters
Bennett is significant for Pennsylvania municipal, employment, and tort counsel because it separates a government defendant’s status from the nature of the pleaded claim. Naming a township supervisor does not automatically trigger a six-month deadline. Lawyers must read Section 5522’s residual language alongside the limitations period assigned to the substantive cause of action.
The scope-of-employment analysis also affects more than timing; it can shape immunity and indemnification defenses later in the case. Plaintiffs should plead concrete facts showing personal purpose and departure from assigned duties, while municipal defendants should develop evidence connecting the conduct to authorized responsibilities and a governmental objective. Because the ruling came at the pleadings stage, it does not establish liability. It ensures that Bennett receives factual development before the court decides whether Dence’s intervention was official municipal activity or personal interference.