Background
Pennsylvania’s approximately $1 billion opioid settlement — reached in 2022 after the Commonwealth sued pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors — is administered by the Pennsylvania Opioid Misuse and Addiction Abatement Trust (Trust). Under the amended consent order, Trust funds may be disbursed “only for the purposes set forth in Exhibit E to the Settlements,” a 15-page list of approved abatement programs divided into Schedule A (priority core strategies) and Schedule B (a non-exhaustive list of treatment, prevention, and other efforts). Counties receive annual disbursements and must report expenditures to the Trust for retrospective compliance review. If the Board of Trustees (Board) determines funds were spent inconsistently with Exhibit E, it may withhold next-year payments. Counties that dispute a Board determination may file a complaint under Section VIII(G) of the Order and, if unresolved, petition the Commonwealth Court for specialized review — a mechanism this Court formalized by case management order in July 2025.
Chester County District Attorney (Petitioner) used Trust funds to employ a “Deputy District Attorney — Drug Court,” a position that supports Chester County’s Drug Court — a pretrial diversion program combining judicial supervision with substance-use treatment. Petitioner categorized the expenditure under Exhibit E, Schedule B, Section D(3), which covers “treatment and recovery courts that provide evidence-based options for persons with” opioid and other substance use disorders. After a working-group recommendation of noncompliance, the Board’s Dispute Resolution Committee held two hearings. Expressing concern that approving the position would “set a precedent” for using Trust funds to pay prosecutors, the Committee voted five to one against compliance. The Trust confirmed its decision by email, stating that the June 5, 2025 non-compliance determination “stands.” Petitioner timely petitioned this Court for specialized review.
The Court’s Holding
Remanded. Judge Dumas, writing for a three-judge panel, declined to reach the merits of whether the deputy district attorney position qualifies under Exhibit E. Instead, the court concluded that the Board’s September 17, 2025 email did not constitute a reasoned decision suitable for appellate review and remanded with instructions that the Board issue an appropriate decision within 30 days.
The court grounded its authority to remand in 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 323, 562, and 706, which authorize courts to issue orders “as the interest of justice may require” and to “remand the matter and direct the entry of such appropriate order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” Drawing an analogy to Artisan Construction Group v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Pottsgrove Township, 275 A.3d 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022), where this court remanded for a Rule 1925(a) decision because the trial court’s order and record did not reveal underlying reasoning, the court held that the same principle applies here: without a decision explaining the Board’s reasoning, the court cannot conduct any appellate review.
The court specified that the Board’s remand decision must: (1) identify the Exhibit E section or sections at issue and explain why the program does not qualify; (2) provide specific findings of fact, with citations to the record, that support the determination; (3) reflect any credibility determinations that informed those findings; and (4) define any undefined terms of art relied upon in reaching the decision — including “evidence-based” and “evidence-informed” — to the extent those terms justify the denial.
Key Takeaways
- The Pennsylvania Opioid Trust Board must issue reasoned decisions — with specific findings of fact, record citations, credibility determinations, and defined terms — when it denies a county’s expenditure as noncompliant with Exhibit E. An email confirmation of a vote result, without any explanatory reasoning, does not satisfy this requirement and provides no basis for appellate review.
- The Commonwealth Court has broad remedial authority under 42 Pa.C.S. § 706 to remand when an administrative body’s decision lacks the characteristics of a reasoned adjudication. This authority applies to Trust proceedings even though the Trust is not a Commonwealth agency, local agency, judicial agency, or legislative agency under the consent order.
- Trust beneficiaries seeking review of Board compliance determinations must proceed via “petition for specialized review” under Chapter 16 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, pursuant to the Court’s July 2025 case management order. This is the established procedural vehicle for Section VIII(G)(2) disputes.
- The Board’s use of undefined terms — “evidence-based,” “evidence-informed” — as a basis for denying programs without defining those terms in its decisions creates a reviewability problem. On remand, the Board must supply definitions sufficient to allow the court to assess whether the denial was consistent with the applicable Exhibit E standard.
- Counties that expend Trust funds before receiving Board pre-approval — which the retroactive review structure of the consent order permits — risk clawback of next-year payments if the Board finds noncompliance. This structural feature of the Trust remains in place; the court declined to order pre-approval procedures.
Why It Matters
For Pennsylvania counties, district attorneys, and practitioners advising Trust beneficiaries, Chester County DA establishes an important procedural floor: the Board cannot sustain a compliance denial through a bare email vote confirmation. The decision will require the Board to retool its dispute-resolution process to generate written decisions that include the findings and reasoning necessary for appellate oversight. Until such decisions exist, the Commonwealth Court cannot evaluate — and therefore cannot affirm — denials on the merits.
The underlying merits question — whether Trust funds may be used to support a district attorney’s role in treatment court eligibility determinations — remains open. The Board’s argument that a deputy district attorney is fundamentally a “law enforcement” position exercising prosecutorial discretion, while Petitioner’s argument is that only a district attorney can approve diversion to treatment court as a matter of law, will both need to be addressed in the reasoned decision on remand. That question may prove significant for the dozens of Pennsylvania counties operating drug treatment courts and using Trust funds in that context.