Background
Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act (PHRA), Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951–963, prohibits discrimination in housing and other contexts on the basis of disability, among other protected characteristics. Section 5(h)(3.2) of the Act bars housing providers from refusing to make reasonable accommodations for tenants with disabilities. Unlike federal civil-rights statutes that create a presumption of attorney’s fees for prevailing parties, the PHRA gives the Commission discretion to award fees; there is no mandatory fee-shifting, and a prevailing complainant must demonstrate that an award is appropriate in light of the circumstances.
Pamela McDuffie filed a complaint in 2018 against Tunic Group, LLC, the management company for her apartment building, alleging that Tunic refused to grant four disability-related accommodations: a transfer to an A-level apartment, a reserved handicap-accessible parking space, enforcement of anti-dumping policies to ensure unobstructed use of her parking space, and a functioning intercom system. A Hearing Examiner found that Tunic had violated Section 5(h)(3.2) and recommended that the Commission order compensatory damages and other relief. The Commission’s January 27, 2025 Final Order adopted that recommendation, awarded $60,000 in compensatory damages for embarrassment and humiliation, and also awarded $60,000 in attorney’s fees and $802 in costs.
Petitioner’s counsel had submitted a detailed fee application requesting $108,868.30. The Commission reduced the requested fees by nearly half, citing two reasons: (1) the requested amount was “almost twice the amount of the award to [Petitioner] for the emotional distress” she had suffered, and (2) $60,000 was “appropriate and comparable to awards in similar cases before the Commission.” The Commission did not discuss the Harris II factors it had previously articulated as the framework for evaluating fee requests. McDuffie appealed, contending that the Commission capriciously disregarded her detailed fee application.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Fizzano Cannon, writing for a panel of Jubelirer, P.J., Fizzano Cannon, J., and Wallace, J., reversed the attorney’s fee award and remanded for further proceedings. The court acknowledged the high standard for overturning a discretionary fee award, citing Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998), for the proposition that reversal requires “manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly erroneous.” Nevertheless, the court found the Commission’s explanation deficient on two grounds.
First, comparing the requested fee to the emotional distress award on a ratio basis is legally insufficient as a sole justification for reducing the fee. Citing Arches Condo. Ass’n v. Robinson, 131 A.3d 122 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), the court noted that while the value of the judgment is one relevant factor, it is not the only factor. Fees and damages serve different purposes, and many reasons may explain a gap between them—the difficulty of the case, the hours necessarily expended to establish liability, the skill of counsel, and the like. Second, the Commission’s reference to “similar cases” was inadequate because the Final Order provided no details about those cases. Without knowing their subject matter, the complexity of the legal work involved, or the size of the underlying damages, the court could not assess whether the comparisons were meaningful. The court further noted that the Commission had not addressed any of the remaining Harris II factors, including time and labor, the difficulty of the questions, the skill required, the attorney’s customary fee, the prevailing hourly rate in the community, the attorney’s experience and reputation, or whether a contingency arrangement was in place. While the Commission need not discuss every factor, it must provide enough explanation to enable meaningful appellate review.
Key Takeaways
- Under the PHRA, attorney’s fees are discretionary but, when awarded, must be justified by sufficient explanation of the Harris II factors; the Commission’s failure to discuss any of those factors beyond the ratio of fees to compensatory damages was reversible error.
- The ratio of requested fees to the underlying damages award is a permissible consideration but is insufficient on its own to justify a fee reduction; fees may substantially exceed the damages in cases requiring extensive legal work to establish liability.
- References to “similar cases” in support of a fee award must include enough information—case type, legal complexity, damages, hours expended—to allow appellate review of whether the comparison is valid.
- The Harris II considerations include: time and labor required; difficulty of the questions; requisite skill; the attorney’s customary fee and prevailing hourly rate; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; whether a contingency arrangement was in place; the amount of the claim and results obtained; and the size of awards in similar cases. At minimum, the Commission must engage with the factors that actually inform its decision.
Why It Matters
This decision is practically significant for practitioners litigating disability discrimination and other PHRA claims before the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. The court makes clear that the Commission cannot reduce a fee application by simply comparing the dollar amount to the compensatory award—a tempting but legally insufficient shortcut. Fee applications in PHRA cases require a genuine multi-factor analysis, and the Commission’s obligation to explain itself is not discharged by a citation to “similar cases” that are not described in the record.
From the petitioner’s standpoint, the decision underscores the value of filing detailed fee applications with itemized time entries and documentation of the Harris II factors. The more thorough the record before the Commission, the harder it is for the Commission to cut fees without engaging with that record. On remand, the Commission will need to work through the factors explicitly, which may result in a higher fee award or may result in the same $60,000 award supported by a more adequate explanation. This is an unreported (non-precedential) opinion, but it applies established Commonwealth Court authority on fee-award adequacy and is citable for persuasive value under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).