Background
Katherine Purcell and Carole Caples became embroiled in consolidated litigation involving family businesses, loans, joint accounts, and a Whitehall property. Caples had placed the property in both women’s names as joint tenants with a right of survivorship. After its sale, Purcell retained half of the proceeds. Caples alleged that Purcell owed and breached a fiduciary duty because Purcell held a power of attorney and occupied a confidential relationship with her.
A six-day jury trial produced verdicts running in both directions. Among other findings, the jury awarded Purcell damages on a loan agreement but found that she breached a fiduciary duty concerning the property-sale proceeds and awarded Caples approximately $131,000 on that claim. The trial court molded portions of the verdict, including prejudgment interest, and entered judgments exceeding $168,000 for Caples and $77,000 for Purcell.
Both sides appealed. After an initial panel proceeding, the Superior Court granted en banc review. Purcell argued that she was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence did not show that she exercised the power of attorney or otherwise acted as Caples’s agent in arranging the deed, sale, or equal distribution. Caples raised a series of cross-appeal issues involving contract recovery, punitive damages, interest, and evidentiary rulings.
The Court’s Holding
The en banc majority affirmed the judgment. Applying the demanding standard for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it viewed the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Caples as verdict winner. The majority concluded that the trial record permitted the jury to find a fiduciary relationship and breach concerning the disposition of sale proceeds, and it declined to replace the jury’s factual assessment with Purcell’s competing account.
The court also sustained the trial court’s treatment of the parties’ contract claims and prejudgment interest. In Pennsylvania contract litigation, prejudgment interest is recoverable as of right when payment is withheld after it becomes due and the amount is ascertainable by calculation. The trial judge was not required to accept the jury’s unexplained interest figure and could mold the verdict using the legally applicable calculation.
A two-judge concurrence and dissent would have granted Purcell judgment on the fiduciary-duty claim. The dissent reasoned that the power of attorney alone did not prove Purcell acted as Caples’s agent in this transaction, while the deed unambiguously created equal survivorship interests. That disagreement frames the central evidentiary risk: a formal agency document and a broader course of dealings may support fiduciary liability, but the connection between the relationship and the challenged transaction remains contestable.
Key Takeaways
- An en banc majority upheld fiduciary-duty liability arising from the handling of proceeds from jointly titled real estate.
- Judgment notwithstanding the verdict remains an exceptional remedy, with disputed facts and inferences viewed in favor of the verdict winner.
- Prejudgment interest on an ascertainable Pennsylvania contract debt is a legal entitlement that the trial court may calculate when molding a verdict.
- The dissent would require clearer proof that an agent actually exercised authority or controlled the transaction giving rise to the alleged breach.
Why It Matters
The decision matters to fiduciary, estate-planning, and closely held business disputes because property documents rarely exist in isolation. A deed may establish legal ownership, yet powers of attorney, dependence, control over finances, and the parties’ course of conduct can shape a jury’s assessment of equitable duties. Lawyers should build a transaction-specific record showing who proposed the title arrangement, arranged the sale, directed payment, and understood the disposition of proceeds.
The case also offers a practical damages lesson. Verdict forms should distinguish principal, prejudgment interest, and any equitable adjustment, with dates and rates stated clearly. Post-trial counsel should be prepared to show whether damages were ascertainable at breach and to provide a calculation the court can audit when molding judgment.
Because the ruling came from the court en banc, commercial litigators should note the sharp divide over transaction-specific proof. The majority’s deference to the verdict makes preservation essential: objections to fiduciary-duty instructions, special interrogatories, and evidentiary sufficiency must be framed before the verdict and renewed in post-trial motions. The dissent supplies a roadmap for arguing that a power of attorney creates duties only when authority is exercised, while the affirmance shows why a broader evidentiary narrative can still reach the jury.