Background
Camryn Souchet was employed as a full-time electrical apprentice by RSR Electric, LLC, a division of Velocity Group, for approximately seven months. His job description stated that apprentices were “responsible for seeking out and learning new skills” and that it was “suggested” they attend a formal apprenticeship program. The description outlined a four-year progression of skills but set no deadlines and imposed no consequences for declining the suggested training.
In early August 2024, when the employer asked about enrollment in an Associated Builders and Contractors apprenticeship program, Souchet declined. On August 13, 2024, he texted his supervisor: “Hey Skip I made up my mind about electrical and I don’t think I’m gonna take it further will I be able to go back into Nitro Cutting if that’s a possibility?” Nitro Cutting was another division of Velocity Group where Souchet had previously worked for nearly two years. The next day, the employer terminated Souchet, stating that he did not want to continue his electrical career and no positions were available at Nitro Cutting.
A Referee found Souchet eligible for benefits, concluding the employer terminated him and his conduct did not constitute willful misconduct. The Board adopted those findings and affirmed. The employer appealed, arguing the text message was a voluntary resignation and that declining the suggested training was willful misconduct.
The Court’s Holding
In a 2-1 decision, the Commonwealth Court affirmed. On the threshold question of whether the separation was voluntary or involuntary, the majority held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that Souchet was discharged rather than having voluntarily quit. While the text message expressed reservations about continuing in the electrical field, it did not set a resignation date, and the employer terminated Souchet the very next day. The majority cited York Tape & Label Corp. v. UCBR, 435 A.2d 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), for the principle that expressions of hesitation or dissatisfaction — even inquiring about other positions — do not, without more, constitute a voluntary quit. Notably, the employer itself had stipulated at the hearing that “the parties decided that [Claimant] no longer had a job with the Employer and discharged him.”
On the willful misconduct question under Section 402(e) of the UC Law, the majority found the employer failed to carry its burden. The job description only “suggested” participation in a formal apprenticeship — it did not require it. Souchet was seven months into a four-year position, had met all performance expectations, had received no prior discipline, and had never been placed on a performance improvement plan. The employer conceded that employees were not required to obtain training through any specific program. Without evidence that the employer sought clarification about Souchet’s training intentions before terminating him the next day, the assertion of willful misconduct was premature.
Judge Covey dissented, arguing that an electrical apprentice who announces he is “no longer interested in electrical work” has disregarded the standards of behavior an employer can rightfully expect, constituting willful misconduct. She also contended the separation should have been analyzed as a voluntary quit under Section 402(b).
Key Takeaways
- Under Pennsylvania unemployment law, an employee’s expression of career hesitation or inquiry about transferring to another position does not constitute a voluntary quit — particularly when the employer terminates the employee the following day without further discussion.
- Declining a “suggested” (not required) training program does not constitute willful misconduct, especially where the employee is early in a multi-year progression, has no prior discipline, and meets current performance standards.
- The Board’s factual findings — including that an employee intended to continue working despite expressing reservations — are conclusive on appeal when supported by substantial evidence, even if contrary evidence exists.
- The dissent’s reasoning illustrates that these cases can be close calls: employers may have stronger arguments when training requirements are mandatory rather than merely suggested, or when the employee’s statements more clearly indicate a refusal to perform essential job functions.
Why It Matters
This split decision highlights the fine line between a voluntary resignation and an employer-initiated discharge in Pennsylvania unemployment cases. For employers, the lesson is clear: when an employee expresses dissatisfaction or hesitates about a career path, rushing to terminate — rather than engaging in documented conversations about expectations and alternatives — risks converting what might be a voluntary quit into an involuntary discharge that preserves benefits eligibility. The employer’s own stipulation that it “discharged” the claimant proved particularly damaging.
For employment practitioners, the case also reinforces that “suggested” training requirements carry far less weight in willful misconduct analysis than mandatory ones. Employers who want to condition continued employment on participation in specific programs should make those requirements explicit, documented, and communicated with clear consequences — not merely “suggested” in a job description. The dissent’s vigorous disagreement signals that this area of law remains actively contested, and future panels may draw the line differently on similar facts.