Background
On September 30, 2013, Bryan Edward Menge was injured in a rear-end chain-reaction collision in Warwick, Rhode Island while driving a vehicle belonging to Barry Johnson. The at-fault driver, Rene Mathieu Jr., was insured by GEICO. Menge claimed chronic back, pelvic, and abdominal injuries, alleging over $75,000 in medical bills and $250,000 in lost income. He held a business-owner’s policy from Main Street America Assurance Company (MSAA) that was in effect at the time of the accident.
In 2016, Menge sued the Mathieus directly in a related Kent County Superior Court action, which he settled in December 2024 for $100,000. The release he executed broadly discharged not only the Mathieus but “all other persons, firms and corporations” from any claims arising from the September 30, 2013 accident. In September 2023, Menge filed the present action directly against GEICO (the adverse driver’s insurer) and MSAA (his own business insurer), asserting breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and statutory bad faith.
The Superior Court severed the bad faith and implied covenant claims pending resolution of the contract claims, denied Menge’s motion to compel a fifth round of document production from GEICO, and ultimately granted both defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Menge, proceeding pro se, appealed all three rulings to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed summary judgment for MSAA, holding that the plain language of Menge’s 2013 business-owner’s policy expressly excluded bodily injury or property damage “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any . . . ‘auto.'” Because Menge’s personal injury claim stemming from an automobile accident fell squarely within that exclusion, there was no coverage as a matter of law. The court rejected Menge’s argument that a genuine dispute of fact existed over the policy’s authenticity, finding that MSAA’s sworn attestation that exhibit 2 was a true and accurate copy sufficed, and that the 2011 policy Menge himself submitted contained an identical auto-exclusion provision. The Court also declined to consider a purportedly “true” version of the policy (exhibit K) that Menge submitted for the first time on appeal, as it was not part of the trial record. Without a viable breach of contract claim, the derivative bad faith and implied covenant claims necessarily failed.
The Court affirmed summary judgment for GEICO on independent and equally dispositive grounds. Rhode Island General Laws § 27-7-2 prohibits an injured party from joining an adverse driver’s insurer as a direct defendant unless specific statutory exceptions apply—none of which were present here. The Mathieus were alive and served with process in the related action, and Menge obtained no judgment against them, settling instead for a lump sum. Because Menge failed to argue the § 27-7-2 issue in his appellate briefing, the Court found the point waived, but addressed it anyway and found GEICO’s direct-action bar dispositive. The Court further held that the broad release Menge executed when settling with the Mathieus extinguished any remaining claims against GEICO. The severance orders and the denial of the motion to compel were rendered moot by the failure of all underlying claims.
Key Takeaways
- A business-owner’s policy with an express automobile-use exclusion provides no coverage for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, even if the insured believes otherwise—courts apply plain policy language without departing from it absent genuine ambiguity.
- Rhode Island’s direct-action statute (G.L. § 27-7-2) bars an injured claimant from suing an adverse driver’s insurer directly unless narrow statutory exceptions (e.g., defendant’s death, non est inventus service, post-judgment enforcement) are satisfied; settling the underlying tort action for a lump sum without obtaining a judgment forecloses those options.
- A party opposing summary judgment bears the affirmative burden of producing specific evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact; bare assertions that a document is inauthentic, without an alternative authenticated version in the trial record, are insufficient to defeat a well-supported motion.
- Under Rhode Island law, claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and statutory bad faith are derivative of the underlying contract claim—if the insured cannot establish a right to coverage, the bad faith claims fail as a matter of law.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces two significant procedural and substantive barriers that injured parties in Rhode Island must navigate when pursuing insurance claims after an automobile accident. First, it confirms that the state’s direct-action prohibition is broadly construed: settling a tort claim without first obtaining a judgment against the insured effectively waives the right to seek further recovery directly from the adverse insurer, including any potential excess exposure under Asermely v. Allstate. Plaintiffs’ counsel should structure settlements carefully to preserve such rights where applicable.
Second, the case illustrates the limits of challenging policy authenticity at summary judgment. The Court’s refusal to consider a new exhibit submitted for the first time on appeal underscores that litigants must develop their evidentiary record in the trial court. For insurers, the decision reaffirms that a credible attestation accompanying a policy copy can satisfy the authenticity threshold at summary judgment, even without a signed original, provided the opposing party cannot produce a materially different version within the trial record.