Background
Warwick Cove Marina, a Rhode Island property owner, retained attorney Elizabeth McDonough Noonan and her firm Adler Pollock & Sheehan in 2010 to represent it in ongoing property tax disputes with the City of Warwick. John H. Williams was the Marina’s president and sole stockholder. Attorney Noonan represented the Marina from 2010 through December 2016, conducting negotiations with the City in efforts to resolve the tax issues. Williams’s deposition testimony showed he was actively involved, receiving billing statements and participating in settlement discussions.
In December 2016, Williams retained new counsel to take over the tax matters. Attorney Noonan formally transferred all related files on February 15, 2017, terminating the representation. More than three years later, on April 21, 2020, Williams and the Marina filed a legal malpractice complaint alleging that Attorney Noonan had negligently failed to act with sufficient competence and to zealously represent their interests. The Superior Court granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
The Court’s Holding
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the three-year statute of limitations under Rhode Island General Laws § 9-1-14.3 barred the malpractice claim. The attorney-client relationship terminated on February 15, 2017, and the limitations period began running on that date. Because the complaint was filed on April 21, 2020—over three years later—it was time-barred.
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they did not discover the alleged malpractice until receiving a receiver’s report. Williams’s own deposition testimony established that he was aware of Attorney Noonan’s work throughout representation, including through emails, bills, and direct participation in negotiations. He testified about specific disagreements with her negotiation strategy, believing “the homework” was not being done and that negotiations were “futile.” These facts were sufficient to place a reasonable person on notice of a potential malpractice claim.
The court also rejected an affidavit in which Williams claimed ignorance of the malpractice until the receiver’s report, finding it contradicted his earlier deposition testimony. Because Williams offered no explanation for this shift, the affidavit could not create a genuine issue of material fact about when malpractice was discovered or defeat summary judgment.
Key Takeaways
- The statute of limitations for legal malpractice begins running when the attorney-client relationship ends, not when a client later concludes the representation was inadequate or when damage becomes apparent.
- Under the discovery rule’s objective standard, a client is charged with knowledge of potential malpractice when aware of facts that would place a reasonable person on notice—including communications, bills, and knowledge of the attorney’s strategy and work.
- Affidavits contradicting prior deposition testimony without satisfactory explanation are insufficient to defeat summary judgment and create genuine disputes of fact.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly constrains Rhode Island malpractice claimants’ ability to resurrect time-barred claims. The ruling establishes that the statute’s three-year clock begins when counsel’s representation ends—a fixed date not extended by later discovery of inadequate performance. Clients must file suit promptly, and courts will not toll the deadline based on subsequent events like business failure or receivership. For clients actively involved in representation and receiving bills and communications from counsel, the limitations period starts immediately upon termination, regardless of when client dissatisfaction crystallizes.
For attorneys facing late claims, the ruling provides meaningful protection. It confirms that active client involvement and communication during representation—rather than surprised discovery of malpractice years later—governs the limitations analysis. The court’s skeptical treatment of Williams’s contradictory testimony also demonstrates that courts will hold parties to positions taken under oath during discovery and will not permit affidavits to rescue claims through unexplained shifts in testimony.