Background
On 16 March 2023, Toh Sze Ee drove a van that collided with and ran over Hossen Selim, a cyclist, along Kaki Bukit Avenue 5. The victim suffered severe injuries requiring emergency hospitalization, multiple surgeries, and intensive care. He was eventually repatriated to Bangladesh and died on 12 February 2025. The accused and victim were acquainted through dealings in contraband cigarettes and had arranged to meet that day.
The accused was initially charged with attempted murder under Penal Code s 307(1). At the close of the prosecution’s case, the charge was amended to voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means under Penal Code s 326, which the accused did not oppose. The sole disputed issue at trial was whether the accused intentionally struck the victim or, as he claimed, fell asleep at the wheel seconds before the collision.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Andre Maniam rejected the accused’s defense and found him guilty of the s 326 offense. The court’s analysis centered on the accused’s credibility and consistency. The judge found that the accused never told his close associate Teo (who arrived at the scene immediately after the collision) or his girlfriend Irene that he had fallen asleep. This omission undermined his version of events, since one would naturally mention falling asleep if that were the true cause of the accident. Instead, the accused told both Teo and Irene that the victim had suddenly cycled into his path—an explanation contradicted by in-vehicle camera footage and abandoned by the accused at trial.
The court noted critical inconsistencies in the accused’s statements to police. In his first statement to police (28 June 2023), he mentioned falling asleep; however, in subsequent statements, when directly asked whether he told Irene of this, he repeatedly said he could not remember or recall doing so. At trial, more than two years later, he claimed he had told Irene, contradicting his earlier admissions of uncertainty. The court accepted the evidence of the two officers who recorded Teo’s 12 January 2026 statement (four days before trial), which clearly stated the accused “never mentioned” that the collision was due to falling asleep. The court found this contemporaneous statement more reliable than Teo’s attempted shift in testimony after he spoke with the accused the day before taking the stand. Medical evidence from psychiatrist Dr Charles Mak also undermined the “fell asleep” defense: the accused did not meet diagnostic criteria for stimulant withdrawal, maintained normal functioning on the day in question (navigation, socializing, completing a U-turn), and Dr Mak opined it was unlikely he fell asleep due to methamphetamine withdrawal.
Key Takeaways
- An accused’s failure to disclose his primary defense (falling asleep) to close associates immediately after the incident, combined with the offering of a false alternative explanation to them, substantially undermines that defense’s credibility.
- Inconsistencies between police statements and trial testimony—particularly regarding whether the accused told his girlfriend of falling asleep—weigh heavily against the accused when the earlier statement is made under formal recording procedures with interpreter verification.
- Expert evidence that withdrawal symptoms are unlikely to have caused the level of impairment claimed does not eliminate the possibility of falling asleep generally, but remains probative when combined with other credibility deficits.
- The court will prefer a clearly recorded police statement (confirmed by recording officers and interpreters) over an attempted change in witness testimony made after the witness has conferred with the accused.
Why It Matters
This judgment illustrates the court’s rigorous approach to evaluating credibility in traffic collision cases where the accused offers an involuntary-act defense (falling asleep). The decision reinforces that the prosecution need not eliminate every theoretical possibility of accident; instead, the court will weigh the accused’s own conduct, statements, and medical evidence holistically. The ruling is significant for practitioners because it shows that an accused’s deliberate concealment of his defense from immediate associates—coupled with the provision of a false account—can alone justify conviction, independent of direct evidence of intent.
The judgment also demonstrates heightened scrutiny of witness recollection when that recollection shifts only after private communication with the accused. By accepting the contemporaneous police statement over the later trial testimony, the court signaled that formal recorded statements with interpreter oversight carry substantial weight when challenged by oral testimony lacking independent corroboration. For motor vehicle prosecution and defense, this case underscores the critical importance of an accused’s immediate post-incident statements and admissions to third parties.