Background
Eric Bowman was found liable for civil assault and battery against Wallace Blair Crosby in a Charleston County jury trial. The jury awarded Crosby approximately $1.87 million in actual damages — encompassing past and future medical expenses, physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life — plus $2.8 million in punitive damages, for a total verdict of roughly $4.67 million. A related case filed by Samantha Albert against Bowman arising from the same events was consolidated with Crosby’s action.
Before trial, the court granted Crosby’s directed verdict motion on the issue of Bowman’s liability based on Bowman’s prior guilty plea to criminal assault and battery in the third degree. The jury therefore decided only damages. After trial, Bowman raised five grounds of error: (1) the trial court erred in denying a new trial based on allegedly improper closing argument statements by Crosby; (2) the court erred in denying motions for new trial nisi remittitur and new trial absolute because the verdict was excessive and unsupported; (3) the court erred in denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on punitive damages as grossly excessive; (4) the court erred in granting Crosby’s directed verdict on liability based on the guilty plea; and (5) the court erred in refusing certain requested jury charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed on all five points.
The Court’s Holding
Affirmed. The court applied Rule 220(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules and cited the controlling authority for each issue.
On the directed verdict from the guilty plea — the most notable issue — the court applied Doe v. Doe, 346 S.C. 145 (2001), which establishes that “once a person has been criminally convicted he is bound by that adjudication in a subsequent civil proceeding based on the same facts underlying the criminal conviction.” The guilty plea, the court held under Zurcher v. Bilton, 379 S.C. 132 (2008), “fully and fairly litigates the matter in the same manner as a contested trial in which a defendant is adjudicated guilty,” and therefore collaterally estops relitigation of liability in the civil suit. Because Bowman’s guilty plea conclusively established that he committed the assault and battery, the trial court properly removed liability from the jury’s consideration.
On the closing argument issue, the court affirmed because Bowman failed to object to Crosby’s allegedly improper statements contemporaneously — and the failure to object during closing argument is a waiver precluding appellate review. On actual damages, the court held the jury’s determination was entitled to substantial deference because pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life have no market price and cannot be exactly determined; the jury’s discretion in quantifying these harms is broad so long as the verdict is not the product of passion or improper motive. On punitive damages, the JNOV arguments were limited to grounds raised in the prior directed verdict motion. On jury charges, the court affirmed without further analysis.
Key Takeaways
- In South Carolina, a criminal guilty plea to assault and battery will collaterally estop the defendant from contesting civil liability for the same conduct. The trial court may properly direct a verdict against that defendant on liability and send only the question of damages to the jury.
- Failure to object to opposing counsel’s closing argument statements contemporaneously waives appellate review of whether those statements were improper. The objection must be raised during the closing argument itself, not post-verdict.
- Actual damages for assault and battery encompassing pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life are reviewed with substantial deference. South Carolina courts recognize that these categories lack a market price and their quantification rests in the sound discretion of the jury, checked by the trial court’s new trial powers.
- A JNOV motion may only reassert grounds raised in the directed verdict motion. Arguments about punitive damages that were not previously presented at the directed verdict stage cannot be raised for the first time on a JNOV.
Why It Matters
Bowman v. Crosby is a practical reminder that criminal dispositions have downstream civil consequences in South Carolina. A defendant who pleads guilty to an assault charge — whether for sentencing leniency, certainty, or any other reason — surrenders the right to contest liability in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the victim. For civil defense practitioners retained after a guilty plea, the strategic options are limited to damages: challenging the amount awarded, seeking remittitur, or arguing that the punitive award was the product of passion or prejudice.
The $4.67 million total verdict — affirmed without remittitur — also illustrates the potential exposure in civil assault cases where the jury has clear liability and broad discretion on intangible harms. South Carolina juries may separately itemize actual damages components (past and future medical, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of enjoyment of life) and the court will affirm so long as each component is supported by evidence and the overall award does not indicate improper motive.