Background
Bernard Jackson, an inmate identified as number 210745, pursued a wage dispute against the South Carolina Department of Corrections. His appeal reached the Administrative Law Court, but the parties then negotiated a resolution. Jackson signed both a settlement agreement and a stipulation of dismissal. The agreement specified the total settlement amount, stated that required deductions for victim restitution and room and board had already been taken, and directed that the remaining amount be placed in his E.H. Cooper inmate account.
The writing also addressed the precise issue that later produced the appeal: it said that no additional funds would be placed into long-term savings. SCDC deposited the settlement funds into Jackson’s inmate account, and the stipulation of dismissal was filed with the Administrative Law Court. Jackson nevertheless objected to dismissal, maintaining that negotiations were continuing and that state law entitled him to have ten percent of his earnings deposited into an interest-bearing long-term escrow account.
The Administrative Law Court dismissed the appeal based on the filed stipulation. Jackson appealed pro se. The Court of Appeals initially filed its decision in July 2026, then withdrew it and issued a substituted opinion on November 4, 2026. The substituted decision addressed whether the filed settlement documents permitted the administrative appeal to be dismissed despite Jackson’s later objection.
Jackson’s statutory theory relied on section 24-3-40(A)(5) of the South Carolina Code, which generally requires ten percent of a prisoner’s wages to be held in an interest-bearing escrow account for the prisoner’s benefit. The case did not produce a broad construction of that statute. Instead, the panel resolved the appeal through the procedural effect of the parties’ signed settlement and stipulated dismissal.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Rule 43(k), SCRCP, supplies formal requirements for agreements affecting pending litigation: an agreement must appear in a consent order or written stipulation signed by counsel and entered in the record, be made in open court and recorded, or be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their counsel. Those safeguards prevent later disputes about whether an agreement existed and what its terms were.
The documents here satisfied the governing principle. Jackson entered the written agreement, signed a stipulation of dismissal, and received the negotiated funds. The settlement did not leave the long-term-savings question open. Instead, it expressly stated that the described payment was the total settlement and that no additional amount would be deposited into long-term savings. The stipulation was then filed in the administrative proceeding.
South Carolina treats stipulations as binding concessions made during judicial proceedings. Because the written settlement and dismissal resolved the dispute and were placed before the Administrative Law Court, that court did not err by dismissing the case. The Court of Appeals did not treat the statutory deduction provision as authorizing Jackson to reopen a dispute he had settled on express terms. The enforceability of the filed agreement was dispositive.
The opinion thus distinguishes disagreement with a bargain from a defect in forming it. Jackson did not obtain reversal merely by asserting that the payment should have been allocated differently under the wage statute. With a signed writing expressly excluding further savings deposits and a dismissal filed in the record, the tribunal could enforce the agreed endpoint of the litigation.
Key Takeaways
- A South Carolina settlement affecting pending litigation should comply with Rule 43(k)’s writing, signature, or on-the-record requirements.
- A filed stipulation of dismissal is binding on the party who made it, even when that party later objects to the agreed disposition.
- Specific settlement language addressing the destination and completeness of payment can defeat a later claim for an additional allocation.
- Parties should not describe negotiations as continuing after signing unless the written agreement expressly reserves unresolved terms or conditions.
Why It Matters
For South Carolina practitioners, the case illustrates why settlement documents should close every loop. Counsel should identify the gross and net amounts, deductions, destination of funds, remaining obligations, and whether the payment fully resolves statutory or contractual allocation claims. If performance or agency approval remains a condition, the writing should say so rather than relying on informal understandings.
The opinion is unpublished and generally cannot be cited as precedent under Rule 268(d)(2), SCACR. Even so, its straightforward application of Rule 43(k) is useful in administrative and civil practice: once the parties reduce a complete agreement to a compliant writing and file their dismissal, a later change of position ordinarily will not revive the proceeding.