Background
In November 2023, Kaitlynn Dempsey obtained a one-year order of protection against Erica Fisk from a Tennessee general sessions court. Fisk appealed to the circuit court, which, after review by a special master and a rehearing, issued an amended one-year order of protection against Fisk on May 14, 2024, set to expire on May 14, 2025. Fisk did not file a notice of appeal for this order.
On April 28, 2025, shortly before the order was to expire, Dempsey filed a motion to extend it, alleging a “continued pattern of harassment and cyberstalking.” The hearing on the motion was ultimately scheduled for July 31, 2025. Fisk argued that because the court had not entered a temporary extension, the May 14, 2024 order had expired, making the case moot and depriving the court of jurisdiction to extend it.
At the July 31, 2025 hearing, the trial court found that Dempsey had proven the grounds of stalking by a preponderance of the evidence. The court extended the order of protection for another year, until July 31, 2026. Fisk’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied, and she did not appeal that decision. Instead, in November 2025, she filed a motion to set aside the July 31 order under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, which the trial court denied. Fisk appealed the denial of her Rule 60.02 motion.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, denying Fisk’s motion to set aside the judgment. The court emphasized that relief under Rule 60.02 is an “exceptional remedy” that requires the moving party to provide clear and convincing evidence, and it is not a tool for a party who is simply “dissatisfied with a particular outcome.”
The court first addressed Fisk’s central argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to “extend” an order that had already expired. The appellate court agreed with the trial court’s reasoning: even if the May 2024 order had expired, Dempsey had filed a timely petition, and the court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. Based on the new evidence of stalking presented at the July hearing, the court had the authority to issue a new one-year order of protection. The expiration of the previous order did not nullify the court’s power to hear the case.
The court also rejected Fisk’s claim of “surprise” under Rule 60.02(1). Fisk contended she was unfairly surprised by evidence that she had accessed Dempsey’s “subscriber-only” online content, as this specific act was not detailed in the extension motion. The court held that under Tennessee’s notice pleading standards, the motion’s allegation of “cyberstalking” provided sufficient notice. Furthermore, the court noted that Fisk had already raised these issues in a motion to alter or amend and had failed to appeal that denial, meaning Rule 60.02 could not be used as a substitute for a direct appeal.
Key Takeaways
- A motion for relief from a final judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 is an “exceptional remedy” and not a substitute for a direct appeal or a means to relitigate issues already decided.
- A Tennessee court retains subject matter jurisdiction to hear a timely filed motion to extend an order of protection and issue a new order, even if the previous order expires before the hearing occurs.
- An allegation of “cyberstalking” in a petition is sufficient under notice pleading standards to encompass evidence of specific online activities, such as accessing private, subscriber-only content.
- Parties who fail to file a direct appeal from a final order cannot later use a Rule 60.02 motion to challenge the legal or factual basis of that order.
Why It Matters
This case reinforces the principle of finality in judgments and clarifies the limited scope of Rule 60.02 motions. It serves as a reminder to litigants that they cannot use post-judgment motions to get a second chance at arguments that should have been raised in a direct appeal. For practitioners and parties involved in protective order cases, the ruling provides important procedural clarity.
The decision confirms that a petitioner’s request to extend an order of protection will not be defeated simply because of court scheduling that places the hearing after the original order’s expiration date, as long as the motion to extend was filed in a timely manner. This protects individuals seeking continued protection from being penalized by the court’s calendar, ensuring that the court’s authority to adjudicate the underlying claim of stalking or abuse remains intact.