Mosby v. Meachem — Tennessee Court of Appeals affirms relocation approval where father’s opposition was filed 104 days late, far exceeding the mandatory 30-day statutory deadline

Case
Andrea Jaye Mosby v. Eric Lee Meachem
Court
Tennessee Court of Appeals (Western Section, at Nashville)
Date Decided
June 23, 2026
Docket No.
W2024-01938-COA-R3-CV
Topics
Parental Relocation, Parenting Plan Modification, Family Law, Statutory Interpretation
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Eric Lee Meachem (“Father”) and Andrea Jaye Mosby (“Mother”) divorced in August 2020 and agreed to a permanent parenting plan granting each parent equal parenting time with their minor child, born in 2013. In September 2023, Mother notified Father of her intent to relocate to Atlanta, Georgia, to accept a position as labor and employment counsel after she was unable to find comparable employment in Memphis following her termination as human resources director at a local law firm. Mother provided the required statutory notice and subsequently filed a formal Petition to Relocate with the trial court on October 12, 2023.

Father, through counsel, had emailed an objection to Mother’s attorney in September 2023, but did not file a formal opposition with the court until January 25, 2024—104 days after Mother filed her petition, and well beyond the 30-day deadline imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(b). Mother moved to strike Father’s untimely opposition. The trial court granted the motion to strike, permitted the relocation without conducting a best-interest analysis, and later entered a modified parenting plan designating Mother as primary residential parent with 265 days of parenting time, compared to 100 days for Father. The court also awarded Mother $15,000 in attorney fees out of a claimed total of $61,507.

Father moved for reconsideration, arguing that his prior counsel’s family medical emergency constituted excusable neglect and that the Tennessee General Assembly’s 2018 amendment to the Parental Relocation Statute had rendered the 30-day filing period directory rather than mandatory. The trial court denied reconsideration, and Father appealed.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in all respects. On the central issue, the court held that the 30-day period for a non-relocating parent to file opposition under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(b) remains mandatory, not directory, notwithstanding the 2018 amendments to the statute. The court reasoned that while the legislature in 2018 removed the prior framework requiring courts to consider each parent’s proportionate parenting time and the “reasonable purpose” of the move, it left entirely intact the language mandating that relocation shall be permitted if no timely opposition is filed. The court noted that this identical mandatory construction had been established in Rutherford v. Rutherford, 416 S.W.3d 845 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013), and that the legislature’s decision to amend the statute in other respects while preserving this language signals adoption of that judicial construction.

The court rejected Father’s argument that the trial court should have nonetheless conducted a best-interest analysis before permitting relocation. Under the statute’s plain text, a timely-filed opposition is the condition precedent that triggers the court’s duty to evaluate the enumerated best-interest factors; without it, those factors are simply not implicated. The court also declined to find excusable neglect or good cause under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02 that would justify extending the filing deadline, noting that Father’s counsel offered no adequate explanation for the delay at the January 2024 hearing and that the trial court’s finding of no good cause was supported by the record.

Father’s request for appellate attorney fees was denied for lack of any supporting argument. Mother’s cross-appeal seeking the full $61,507 in attorney fees was also rejected; the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of $15,000, as Mother identified no incorrect legal standard, illogical conclusion, or erroneous evidentiary assessment underlying the partial award.

Key Takeaways

  • Tennessee’s 30-day deadline for a non-relocating parent to file opposition to a relocation petition under T.C.A. § 36-6-108(b) is mandatory: missing it forfeits the right to oppose the move and eliminates the court’s duty to conduct a best-interest analysis.
  • The 2018 amendments to the Parental Relocation Statute did not convert the 30-day filing requirement from mandatory to directory; the legislature’s silence on that provision while amending other parts of the statute is treated as legislative endorsement of prior case law holding it mandatory.
  • An informal email from counsel to opposing counsel does not substitute for a timely court filing under the statute; only a response filed with the court within 30 days of the relocation petition triggers the court’s jurisdiction to evaluate the merits.
  • Attorney fees awarded under T.C.A. § 36-5-103(c) lie within the trial court’s discretion; an appellate court will not substitute its judgment merely because a different award amount might have been chosen.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the strict, self-executing nature of Tennessee’s parental relocation framework. Practitioners representing non-relocating parents must treat the 30-day opposition deadline as a jurisdictional tripwire: missing it—regardless of the reason—effectively concedes the relocation and collapses the court’s role to administrative modification of the parenting plan. The case also underscores that informal communications between counsel, however prompt, do not preserve statutory rights that require a court filing.

The opinion will have particular resonance in cases where a non-relocating parent changes counsel mid-stream or where counsel experiences personal hardship, since the court declined to treat either circumstance as sufficient good cause under Rule 6.02. Family law attorneys should build internal systems to calendar and monitor the 30-day window immediately upon service of any relocation petition, and should not assume that informal objections or substitute-counsel transitions toll or extend that period.

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