Background
Rasheed Akeem Burley entered a plea bargain resolving seven criminal cases. Under the agreement, the State dismissed five cases, and Burley pleaded guilty to reduced charges in the other two. As part of the bargain, he signed waivers of all rights of appeal.
Burley nevertheless sought to appeal all seven cases and filed several related motions. The trial courts certified that he had no right to appeal the two convictions. After the court of appeals warned that the appeals could be dismissed, Burley argued that the federal collateral order doctrine permitted review, that his plea was involuntary, and that he retained limited appellate rights.
The Court’s Holding
The Texas Second Court of Appeals dismissed all seven appeals. It held that it lacked jurisdiction over the five dismissed cases because a criminal defendant generally may appeal only a judgment of guilt or another appealable order, and an order dismissing a criminal charge is not appealable by the defendant.
The court also dismissed the appeals from Burley’s two convictions. His plea bargain curtailed his appellate rights, he expressly waived all rights of appeal, and the trial courts certified that he had no right of appeal. The court rejected his collateral-order argument because the appeals were not interlocutory and held that his allegations that the pleas were involuntary did not expand his right to appeal. It denied all pending motions.
Key Takeaways
- A criminal defendant cannot appeal an order dismissing a criminal charge.
- A valid waiver of all appellate rights made as part of a plea bargain bars an appeal from the resulting conviction.
- An allegation that a plea was involuntary does not, by itself, create a right of direct appeal when the governing certification shows no such right.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that Texas appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases depends on an appealable judgment or order and, in plea-bargain cases, a trial-court certification showing a right of appeal. Defendants cannot avoid those limits by invoking the federal collateral order doctrine or challenging the voluntariness of the plea in a procedurally unauthorized direct appeal.