Background
This memorandum opinion arises from an appeal filed in the Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, at Austin, docketed as No. 03-26-00560-CR. The appeal originated from the 21st District Court of Bastrop County, Texas, in cause number 18,884, where the Honorable Carson Talmadge Campbell presided. The appellant, Casey Tew, initiated the appellate process following proceedings in the trial court, though the specific nature of the underlying criminal case, the charges involved, the trial proceedings, and any issues that may have been raised or intended to be raised on appeal are not detailed in the public opinion.
After the appeal was filed, Tew submitted a motion to dismiss his own appeal. The opinion expressly states that this motion was signed by both Tew personally and by his attorney, indicating a joint decision by the appellant and counsel to terminate the appellate proceedings. The document does not disclose the reasons behind Tew’s decision to seek dismissal, nor does it provide any background regarding the trial court’s judgment, the sentence imposed, or the specific legal arguments that were anticipated or briefed.
The Court’s Holding
The Texas Court of Appeals granted the appellant’s motion and dismissed the appeal. The court’s action was based explicitly on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a), which the opinion cites as the authority for the dismissal. The court stated simply: “We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.” The opinion does not contain any analysis of the merits of the underlying case, any discussion of legal issues, or any reasoning beyond the application of Rule 42.2(a) to the appellant’s voluntary motion.
The disposition is strictly limited to the procedural act of dismissal on the appellant’s own motion. The court did not affirm, reverse, modify, or remand the trial court’s judgment. It did not address any alleged errors, constitutional claims, or evidentiary issues. The opinion is designated as a “Memorandum Opinion” and carries the notation “Do Not Publish,” indicating that it is not intended for official publication and serves primarily to document the court’s action in response to the appellant’s request.
Key Takeaways
- The appeal was dismissed on the appellant’s own motion, signed by both Casey Tew and his attorney, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a).
- The court’s opinion contains no merits analysis, no discussion of underlying charges or trial proceedings, and no legal reasoning beyond the citation to the procedural rule authorizing dismissal.
- The disposition is outcome-only: dismissal of the appeal without affirmance, reversal, remand, or any modification of the trial court’s judgment.
- The opinion is unpublished and carries the “Do Not Publish” designation, limiting its precedential value and indicating its procedural, non-substantive nature.
Why It Matters
This opinion illustrates the procedural mechanism by which a criminal appellant in Texas may voluntarily terminate an appeal. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.2(a) provides the framework for such dismissals, and this case demonstrates its straightforward application when the appellant, represented by counsel, chooses to withdraw the appeal. The joint signature requirement—both appellant and attorney—underscores the seriousness of the decision and ensures that the choice to abandon appellate review is made knowingly and with legal advice.
For practitioners, the case serves as a reminder that not all appellate dispositions involve substantive legal analysis. When an appellant opts to dismiss, the court’s role is typically limited to confirming compliance with procedural requirements and granting the requested relief. The absence of published reasoning in such cases means that attorneys and parties must look to the rules themselves, rather than case-specific precedent, for guidance on voluntary dismissals. The “Do Not Publish” designation further signals that the opinion is not intended to contribute to the development of case law but rather to document the court’s administrative action in closing the appellate matter.