Background
Richard Alan Curlee was convicted by jury of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a young child, committed against two different victims, in violation of Texas Penal Code § 21.02. The jury found him guilty on a Friday, and the trial court scheduled the punishment phase to begin the following Tuesday. Between the guilty verdicts and the punishment phase, Curlee attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head with a firearm he had disassembled and concealed on his person in the courthouse. He was hospitalized and survived, though rendered blind.
Curlee’s trial counsel filed a motion suggesting incompetency and a motion for continuance based on the suicide attempt. The trial court, treating Curlee’s absence as voluntary, proceeded with the punishment phase without him and sentenced him to life imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively. Curlee appealed, raising issues regarding jury sequestration, the trial court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing, denial of the continuance motion, and assessment of court costs. The appellate court initially affirmed, but upon Curlee’s motion for rehearing, it abated the case for a retrospective competency determination.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed all of Curlee’s convictions and sentences. On the jury sequestration issue, the court agreed with both parties that the trial court erred by denying Curlee’s timely request for jury sequestration after the jury was charged. Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 35.23, sequestration is mandatory when either party timely requests it after the charge. However, the error was harmless because the jury received proper instructions regarding conduct while separated, no evidence showed the jury failed to follow those instructions, and the record did not indicate Curlee suffered harm from the jury separation.
Regarding competency, the court held that Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure focuses on the defendant’s mental capacity to consult with counsel, not on the defendant’s logistical access to counsel. Although hospital restrictions prevented Curlee from consulting with his trial counsel, the competency framework requires that any inability to consult stem from mental illness or mental defect. The court declined Curlee’s invitation to extend the competency analysis beyond mental capacity to include external access restrictions. The retrospective competency hearing established that Curlee was competent at the time of the punishment phase, rendering this issue moot.
On voluntary absence, the court held that Curlee’s absence from the punishment phase was voluntary. The psychologist’s testimony established that Curlee had planned his suicide attempt before trial began and executed it as a “calculated decision” in response to the guilty verdicts—not as the result of incompetency or irrational break from reality. The court adopted reasoning from other Texas appellate courts holding that a defendant may be found to have voluntarily absented himself when he attempts suicide and is hospitalized as a result. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with the punishment phase in Curlee’s absence.
Key Takeaways
- Jury sequestration after the jury charge is mandatory when either party timely requests it, but violation is subject to harmless error analysis if no prejudice occurred.
- Competency analysis under Texas law examines the defendant’s mental capacity to consult with counsel, not whether external circumstances prevent access to counsel.
- A defendant who intentionally attempts suicide after conviction and is hospitalized may be deemed to have voluntarily absented himself from trial, permitting proceedings to continue in his absence.
- When multiple cases are tried together, court costs must be assessed only once, not duplicated in separate judgments.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies critical procedural rules for trial courts. While it reaffirms that jury sequestration is mandatory upon request after the jury charge, it establishes that such violation may be harmless if proper jury instructions are given and followed. The holding that competency focuses solely on mental capacity, excluding access to counsel, narrows the scope of competency protections and may affect future cases involving hospitalized defendants.
Most significantly, the decision addresses a novel and troubling scenario: a defendant’s intentional self-harm to avoid trial. By classifying premeditated suicide as voluntary absence rather than incompetency, the court permits trials to proceed despite a defendant’s self-inflicted disability. This holding could have broad implications for how Texas courts handle defendants who become incapacitated through deliberate self-harm, establishing that such conduct does not prevent trial proceeding if deemed calculated and volitional rather than a symptom of mental illness.