Background
In December 2025, pro se appellants Shawna and Durk DeBoer filed an “Owners Affidavit Regarding Purported Conveyance” in the 266th District Court of Erath County, claiming to be owners and managing partners of DeBoer Agricultural Holdings, LLC. They sought to establish that a substitute trustee’s deed conveying real property was fraudulent, invoking Texas Government Code Section 51.9035, which authorizes owners to petition for judicial review of documents allegedly purporting fraudulently to convey title or an interest in property.
The trial court entered findings of fact on March 31, 2026, and conclusions of law on April 16, 2026. On June 10, 2026—fifty-five days after the conclusions of law were signed—the appellants filed a pro se notice of appeal. The same day, the trial court signed an order granting the appellee’s motion to strike the entity’s pleadings because the entity lacked representation by a licensed attorney, resulting in dismissal.
The Court’s Holding
The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Section 51.9035 requires that appeals of a district court’s findings be expedited as “accelerated appeals.” Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b), a notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal must be filed within twenty days after the appealable judgment or order is signed. Filing a post-trial motion does not extend this deadline. The appellants’ deadline was May 6, 2026 (or May 21 with a timely motion for extension), but they filed their notice of appeal on June 10.
The court rejected the appellants’ argument that the June 10 dismissal order constituted a new final appealable order restarting the appeal clock. The court held that the case commenced when the appellants filed their Section 51.9035 petition and ended when the trial court signed its findings and conclusions. The June 10 dismissal order was merely a ministerial order closing the case, not a new independent proceeding. Allowing appellants two separate appeal windows—one from the findings and one from a subsequent dismissal order—would produce an absurd result contrary to legislative intent when the legislature designated this proceeding as an accelerated appeal.
Key Takeaways
- Section 51.9035 appeals are accelerated appeals with a strict twenty-day filing deadline that cannot be extended by post-trial motions.
- A subsequent dismissal order does not restart the appeal deadline or create a new final appealable order independent of the original findings and conclusions.
- Pro se parties must comply with all procedural rules and deadlines, including those governing accelerated appeals.
- The court will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when a notice of appeal is untimely filed, preventing consideration of the merits.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies and reinforces the strict procedural framework governing Section 51.9035 petitions challenging allegedly fraudulent documents conveying real property. The statute’s designation of these appeals as accelerated proceedings reflects legislative intent to provide expedited resolution. Practitioners must note that the twenty-day deadline is inviolable and cannot be salvaged by subsequent orders or additional motions.
The ruling also prevents end-runs around the accelerated appeal deadline by distinguishing between substantive orders disposing of claims (which set the appeal clock) and ministerial orders that merely close proceedings after the appeal deadline has passed. This holding will have practical significance for pro se litigants and attorneys handling real property disputes involving contested documents or deeds.
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