Background
Frank Jackson sought mandamus relief after the Texas Business Court denied his Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a motion to dismiss a tortious-interference claim brought by Barras. Barras alleged that Jackson interfered with his employment agreement with Reynolds and caused his termination as the company’s chairman and CEO.
According to Barras’s live petition, Jackson had represented former Reynolds CEO Bob Brockman in a criminal tax-evasion case and served as trustee of a trust controlling 99% of Reynolds, but Jackson was never employed by Reynolds. Barras alleged that Jackson became deeply involved in Reynolds’s strategy, operations, personnel, and board matters while acting as a trustee, director, or business adviser, and sought to remove Barras so Jackson could obtain the CEO position himself.
The Court’s Holding
The majority conditionally granted Jackson’s petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that attorney immunity barred Barras’s tortious-interference claim and that the Business Court therefore erred by denying Jackson’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The provided opinion is Justice April Farris’s dissent from that ruling.
Justice Farris would have denied mandamus relief. She reasoned that Rule 91a required the court to accept Barras’s factual allegations as true and decide the motion solely from the pleadings. In her view, those allegations permitted a reasonable inference that at least some of Jackson’s challenged conduct was undertaken as a business adviser pursuing personal interests, rather than in the uniquely lawyerly capacity required for attorney immunity. She emphasized that immunity might still be established through summary judgment or at trial, but concluded that its applicability was not established on the face of the pleadings.
Key Takeaways
- The majority held that attorney immunity required dismissal of Barras’s tortious-interference claim and conditionally granted mandamus relief.
- The dissent maintained that Rule 91a’s pleading-stage standard required acceptance of Barras’s allegations and liberal construction of reasonable inferences in his favor.
- Justice Farris concluded that a law license does not automatically immunize business-related conduct and urged Texas Supreme Court guidance on attorneys serving blended legal and executive roles.
Why It Matters
The decision extends attorney immunity, at least under the majority’s application, to alleged conduct performed by an attorney operating in a closely intertwined legal and business-advisory setting. It also illustrates that a denial of a Rule 91a motion based on attorney immunity may be challenged through mandamus.
The dissent highlights the practical difficulty of classifying conduct by attorneys who simultaneously advise owners, serve as trustees or directors, and participate in corporate management. That distinction can determine whether claims against them are dismissed at the pleading stage or proceed to factual development.