Background
K.D.H. gave birth to N.R.H. when she was sixteen and initially relied on her mother for help caring for the child. When K.D.H.’s mother became ill and was hospitalized, K.D.H. agreed that her maternal uncle, R.M.G., could temporarily care for N.R.H. R.M.G. took possession of the child in June 2024 and, approximately four months later, filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship seeking appointment as managing conservator.
The trial court entered temporary orders appointing R.M.G. managing conservator and K.D.H. possessory conservator. More than a year later, K.D.H. challenged R.M.G.’s standing and asked the trial court to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied her plea to the jurisdiction and subsequently signed temporary orders continuing R.M.G.’s managing conservatorship. K.D.H. then sought mandamus relief.
The Court’s Holding
The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that R.M.G. lacked standing under both potentially applicable provisions of the Texas Family Code. He could not establish standing based on actual care, control, and possession because he had possessed N.R.H. for only four months when he filed his original petition, short of the required six months. His later amended petition could not cure that defect because standing was measured when the original petition was filed.
R.M.G. also lacked relative-based standing because, as N.R.H.’s great-uncle, he was related to the child within the fourth degree of consanguinity rather than the statutorily required third degree. K.D.H.’s earlier statements and delay in challenging standing could not confer jurisdiction because standing cannot be created by consent or waiver. The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the conservatorship order, vacate the order denying K.D.H.’s jurisdictional plea, and dismiss R.M.G.’s suit for want of jurisdiction.
Key Takeaways
- A nonparent relying on actual care, control, and possession must satisfy the statutory six-month period when the original SAPCR petition is filed; additional time accruing before an amended petition does not cure the defect.
- Under the law applicable to this October 2024 filing, a great-uncle related to the child within the fourth degree of consanguinity did not qualify for relative-based standing, which required a relationship within the third degree.
- Consent, waiver, delay, or an agreed order cannot confer standing where the governing statute provides none, and temporary SAPCR orders may be challenged through mandamus because they are not appealable.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that statutory standing in Texas custody litigation is a jurisdictional threshold, not a defect that parties may waive or cure through agreement. Courts must assess the facts and statutory law existing when the original petition was filed.
For nonparents seeking conservatorship, failure to meet the governing standing requirements can render temporary custody orders void and require dismissal of the entire proceeding, even after the case has remained pending for an extended period.