Background
In August 2022, James Lewis McGruder went on a prolonged criminal episode in Childress County, Texas—breaking into multiple homes, taking vehicles without permission, and assaulting people. He was arrested and charged with eleven offenses. Appointed counsel requested both a competency evaluation and a sanity evaluation. A December 2022 examination by Dr. Gina Matteson found McGruder incompetent to stand trial; under Article 46C.103(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a sanity evaluation cannot proceed while the defendant is incompetent. McGruder was transferred to a state hospital for competency restoration and, by May 2024, was deemed competent to stand trial—though he continued to take medication for schizoaffective disorder-bipolar type.
After competency was restored, the trial court appointed Dr. Timothy Nyberg to conduct a sanity evaluation pursuant to Article 46C.101(a), which authorizes a court-appointed “statutory expert” when the defendant has filed a notice of insanity defense. When Nyberg attempted to examine McGruder in August 2024, McGruder refused—his later counsel explained that McGruder objected because the examination assumed he had committed the charged offenses, a position inconsistent with his trial strategy of categorical denial. Two sets of trial counsel preceded his final attorney, who filed a notice of insanity defense and a motion for continuance to allow a sanity evaluation. The trial court denied the continuance. After trial, McGruder was convicted of five offenses including multiple counts carrying life sentences. He appealed on two grounds: denial of the sanity evaluation and continuance, and exclusion of competency evidence at trial.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Court of Appeals (Parker, C.J.; Doss, J.; Yarbrough, J.) affirmed. On the sanity evaluation issue, the court held that McGruder had no valid complaint because the trial court had already discharged its statutory obligations—twice. The first appointment was precluded by McGruder’s own incompetency. For the second appointment, the trial court appointed Dr. Nyberg and made McGruder available for examination. McGruder then voluntarily refused to participate. The court held that a defendant who refuses a court-ordered sanity evaluation makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of any right to such an evaluation. The trial court’s obligation extends only to appointing the statutory expert and making the defendant available; it is not required to compel participation or grant an indefinite continuance to retry a refused examination. Denying a third attempt at a sanity evaluation McGruder had already refused was not an abuse of discretion.
On the ineffective assistance of counsel alternative, the court rejected it at the threshold. Prior counsel’s strategy was a categorical denial that McGruder committed the offenses at all—a choice inconsistent with asserting insanity (which presupposes commission of the act). That strategy had at least a plausible professional justification, and the court will not disturb trial strategy on direct appeal absent affirmative evidence in the record that the approach fell below the Strickland standard. The record contained no such evidence.
On the exclusion of competency evidence, the court distinguished—as it must under Texas law—between competency and sanity. Competency evaluates whether a defendant has the mental capacity to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense at the time of trial. Sanity evaluates whether the defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense. These are separate concepts governed by separate statutes. The State’s opening argument had characterized McGruder’s claimed “mental incompetence” as an attempt to game the system; McGruder then sought to introduce testimony about his December 2022 incompetency finding. The trial court excluded it as irrelevant. Even assuming error, the court found no harmful error: the excluded evidence was only that McGruder had been found incompetent to stand trial in 2022—not that he was legally insane at the time of the offenses. Because McGruder also failed to make an offer of proof showing precisely how Matteson’s testimony would have supported his defense, the court lacked the record it would need to find harmful error.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant who refuses to participate in a court-ordered sanity evaluation under Article 46C.101 waives any right to that evaluation. The trial court’s duty is to appoint the statutory expert and make the defendant available—not to compel cooperation or repeatedly reschedule refused examinations.
- Competency to stand trial and the insanity defense are distinct legal concepts in Texas, governed by separate statutes and requiring separate evaluations. Evidence bearing on one does not automatically bear on the other.
- An insanity defense strategy is incompatible with a categorical denial that the defendant committed the charged acts. A trial attorney who elects one strategy cannot be found constitutionally ineffective for not simultaneously pursuing the other, provided the choice has a plausible professional basis.
- Failure to make an offer of proof when the trial court excludes expert testimony makes it nearly impossible to establish harmful error on appeal. Defense counsel in Texas criminal cases must use the bill-of-exception procedure to preserve the specific substance of excluded testimony for appellate review.
Why It Matters
McGruder provides practical guidance on insanity defense procedure in Texas criminal courts. The court’s waiver holding carries a sharp implication for criminal practitioners: a client who refuses to cooperate with a court-ordered sanity evaluation forfeits the ability to complain on appeal that no evaluation was conducted. Attorneys advising mentally ill defendants who wish to assert an insanity defense must advise them clearly and on the record that refusal to participate in the court-appointed examination forecloses the defense—and, practically, forecloses the appeal issue.
The opinion also illustrates the evidentiary trap created by conflating competency and sanity. The State’s opening argument effectively used McGruder’s own statements about “mental incompetence” as evidence of manipulation rather than genuine illness. Defense counsel then lacked the tools to rebut that narrative because the competency finding—legally distinct from a sanity determination—was the only mental-health evidence available, and the court excluded it. Texas criminal practitioners defending clients with mental illness should be deliberate about which statutory pathway they are pursuing and should develop the record accordingly.