Background
Katrina Petrini was originally employed by Simon Group Consulting, Inc. (SGC), a California corporation, while working in California. She later relocated to Texas and continued working for SGC remotely. After a dispute, SGC filed suit in California superior court and obtained a default judgment against Petrini on a counterclaim for misappropriating confidential digital data. In May 2024, SGC domesticated the California judgment in Comal County, Texas. Petrini responded by filing counterclaims in the Texas proceeding asserting claims for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, malicious prosecution, and extrinsic fraud — all based on SGC’s pre-domestication conduct in California.
SGC filed a special appearance challenging Texas courts’ personal jurisdiction over it for those counterclaims. SGC simultaneously moved to dismiss Petrini’s claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a as having no basis in law. The trial court sustained the special appearance and also granted the Rule 91a motion, compelled post-judgment discovery from Petrini, and awarded attorney’s fees to SGC. Petrini appealed all three rulings across fourteen issues.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Court of Appeals (sitting on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin) affirmed the special appearance, dismissed the portion of the appeal challenging the post-judgment discovery order for want of jurisdiction, and declined to address the Rule 91a dismissal as unnecessary given the special appearance ruling. On personal jurisdiction, the court found neither general nor specific jurisdiction existed over SGC.
On general jurisdiction: Petrini argued that SGC’s remote employment of a Texas resident and prior ownership of Texas real property (through a subsidiary) established systematic contacts sufficient to render SGC essentially “at home” in Texas. The court rejected both arguments under BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002). Remote employment of a single Texas resident and prior property ownership, without more, do not render California defendants at home in Texas.
On specific jurisdiction: Petrini’s main argument was that Texas had jurisdiction because SGC domesticated the California judgment in Texas. The court clarified the distinction: domestication of a foreign judgment does constitute purposeful availment of Texas’s judicial machinery, but only for claims that arise from or relate to the domestication and enforcement process itself. Petrini’s counterclaims — malicious prosecution, civil rights violations, and extrinsic fraud — all arose from SGC’s pre-domestication conduct in California courts; they predated and were entirely unrelated to the Texas domestication proceeding. Under Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011), voluntarily filing suit in one jurisdiction subjects a party to personal jurisdiction in another only when the lawsuits arise from the same general transaction. Petrini’s theory that Texas had jurisdiction because SGC “committed a tort” directed at a Texas resident also failed: Texas courts have expressly rejected the “effects test,” holding that directing a tort at a Texas resident is insufficient by itself to confer specific jurisdiction. The court also addressed procedural defects in the original special appearance (lack of verification) and held that SGC’s amendment before any general appearance cured them. Finally, the court confirmed that post-judgment orders compelling discovery are not final appealable orders, depriving it of jurisdiction to review that ruling.
Key Takeaways
- Domesticating a foreign judgment in Texas establishes specific personal jurisdiction over the judgment creditor only for claims arising from the enforcement process itself; it does not expose the creditor to Texas jurisdiction for claims based on pre-domestication conduct in another state.
- Remote employment of a Texas resident and prior ownership of Texas real property, standing alone, do not establish general personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under the “essentially at home” standard.
- Texas courts reject the “effects test” for specific jurisdiction; directing a tort at a Texas-based plaintiff is not sufficient to establish the nonresident defendant’s purposeful availment of Texas courts.
Why It Matters
With remote work increasingly common — and California companies routinely employing Texas-based employees while conducting operations entirely in California — the question of when a Texas court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a California defendant comes up frequently. Petrini draws a sharp line: the mere fact that a California company employed someone in Texas or holds Texas property through a subsidiary does not make it subject to general jurisdiction in Texas. And if the California company domesticates a judgment in Texas, it opens itself to Texas enforcement proceedings but not to Texas adjudication of grievances that arose entirely in California.
For Texas practitioners defending California creditors who face counterclaims after domesticating a judgment, the case provides a clean template for a successful special appearance. The operative test is always whether the specific claims at issue arise from or relate to the Texas contacts — and claims rooted in pre-domestication California conduct will typically fail that test. Practitioners representing Texas-resident defendants in this scenario should understand that their forum-selection strategy may need to include filing counterclaims in California rather than attempting to litigate them as cross-claims in the Texas enforcement proceeding.