Background
Mother filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship concerning R.L.M. The parties attended mediation, which produced a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) signed by both parents and their attorneys on April 9-11, 2025. The MSA included electronic signatures and contained prominent language stating it was not subject to revocation. After mediation, Father’s counsel withdrew. Mother moved to enter an order based on the MSA. The trial court set a hearing for August 28, 2025, and served Father with notice on August 25.
Father did not appear at the August 28 hearing. The district court entered an Agreed Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship in accordance with the MSA. Father filed a motion for new trial, claiming: (1) his signature on the MSA was forged despite the electronic signature; (2) he did not receive timely notice of the hearing; (3) the MSA was unconscionable; and (4) he had newly discovered evidence of Mother using a taser to scare the child, constituting child endangerment.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial. Father appealed, arguing the trial court violated his due process rights, improperly entered judgment on an invalid agreement, and abused its discretion by ignoring child endangerment allegations and his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed. First, the court held that the MSA met all statutory requirements under Texas Family Code § 153.0071(d): it contained prominent non-revocation language (in capital, underlined letters), was signed by both parties and their attorneys, and the electronic signatures satisfied legal signature requirements under Texas Business & Commerce Code § 322.007(d). Because the MSA complied with statutory formalities, the trial court was required to enter judgment and had no discretion to decline. The court rejected Father’s claim that his signature was forged, noting the electronic signature constitutes evidence of his signature and he presented no evidence to the contrary. The court also rejected his unconscionability argument, holding that once an MSA meets statutory requirements, trial courts cannot go behind the agreement to evaluate its merits—permitting unconscionability challenges would render Texas Family Code § 153.0071(e) superfluous.
Second, the court held Father received timely notice. Although Father claimed he received notice on August 25 for an August 28 hearing, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 requires excluding the service date but including the hearing date in calculating notice periods. This gave Father three days’ notice (August 26, 27, and 28), satisfying the requirement for “not less than three days before the court proceeding.”
Third, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. Father failed to meet the statutory requirements for newly discovered evidence because he claimed his prior counsel failed to present evidence rather than claiming he discovered it after the hearing. Regarding the child endangerment allegation, the court held that trial courts cannot refuse to enter judgment on a valid MSA based on a broad “best interests of the child” inquiry. Courts may only decline judgment if specific statutory exceptions under § 153.0071(e-1) apply—namely, findings of family violence impairing decision-making or evidence of abuse/registration history. Father’s taser allegation did not fit these narrow exceptions. Additionally, ineffective assistance of counsel is not available as a basis to challenge judgments in suits affecting the parent-child relationship; it is only available in criminal cases and parental rights termination cases.
Key Takeaways
- Mediated settlement agreements complying with Texas Family Code § 153.0071(d) are binding and require judgment; trial courts have no discretion to refuse entry based on claimed defects unless specific statutory exceptions apply.
- Electronic signatures fully satisfy legal signature requirements for MSAs and constitute evidence of execution; parties must affirmatively prove forgery with evidence.
- Trial courts cannot go behind a valid MSA to evaluate unconscionability, unfairness of terms, or general “best interests” objections; the statutory scheme bars such inquiries.
- Due process notice calculations under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure exclude the service date but include the hearing date, potentially shortening notice periods by one day.
- Ineffective assistance of counsel is unavailable in SAPCR cases and cannot be used to challenge judgment on a valid MSA.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Texas’s strong policy favoring finality and enforceability of mediated settlement agreements in family law matters. By narrowly circumscribing trial court discretion and limiting post-judgment challenges, the ruling protects the integrity of the mediation process and encourages settlement. The holding makes clear that parties cannot use post-hoc objections—fraud claims, unconscionability arguments, or best-interests concerns—to escape agreements that met statutory requirements at execution. This predictability benefits both litigants who successfully negotiate and courts overwhelmed by family law dockets.
The decision also clarifies that electronic signatures are fully binding for MSAs and that parties must raise signature or validity objections promptly, before counsel withdrawals and default hearings occur. For practitioners, the ruling underscores the importance of ensuring all statutory formalities are followed during mediation and of promptly preserving objections if concerns arise. The court’s rejection of child endangerment arguments absent specific statutory findings also signals that trial courts must follow statutory exceptions precisely—they cannot expand their discretion based on child protection concerns, even serious ones.