Background
On February 20, 2020, a four-month-old child (D.V.) suffered fatal injuries while in the care of Edgar Reyes, the boyfriend of the child’s mother. Reyes called emergency services after the child stopped breathing. Medical examination revealed subarachnoid hemorrhage, bilateral retinal hemorrhaging, and no visible external injuries. Reyes initially claimed the child had fallen from a bed but did not mention this account to police during questioning.
Reyes was indicted in May 2020 on four counts: capital murder, murder, injury to a child, and injury to a child by omission. At trial, multiple medical experts testified the injuries were consistent with shaken baby syndrome (abusive head trauma), requiring significant force to cause. Reyes argued the child had a preexisting bleeding disorder contributing to the injuries. The jury acquitted on capital murder and murder charges but convicted on the lesser-included offenses of reckless injury to a child (Count 3) and reckless injury to a child by omission (Count 4), each carrying a 20-year concurrent sentence.
The Court’s Holding
The court vacated Count 4 and affirmed Count 3, finding the dual convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Under Texas Penal Code Section 22.04, the “unit of prosecution” for injury to a child is the resulting injury itself, not the manner (act or omission) by which it was caused. Because medical evidence established that Reyes’ acts caused D.V.’s injuries and the record contained no evidence of a separate injury from any omission, convicting him of both counts constituted multiple punishments for a single offense.
The court also rejected Reyes’ request for a jury instruction on concurrent causation based on a claimed preexisting bleeding disorder. A defendant is entitled to such an instruction only by presenting evidence that his conduct alone was clearly insufficient to cause the injury and that any concurrent cause was clearly sufficient alone. Reyes failed to satisfy this test: he identified no specific bleeding disorder, his expert did not testify to one, and medical evidence overwhelmingly established that shaken baby syndrome caused the injuries. The trial court properly denied the instruction.
Key Takeaways
- Multiple convictions for the same resulting injury under Section 22.04 based on different conduct methods (act versus omission) violate double jeopardy when they represent a single unit of prosecution.
- Defendants seeking concurrent causation instructions must produce evidence both that their conduct alone was clearly insufficient to cause the result and that any concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to do so independently.
- Speculative or unidentified preexisting medical conditions unsupported by defense expert testimony cannot support a concurrent causation instruction when medical evidence clearly establishes intentional injury as the cause.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies double jeopardy protections in Texas child abuse prosecutions. While prosecutors may charge injury to a child through multiple theories, they cannot obtain convictions and sentences for both act and omission when evidence shows a single injury caused by one method. The ruling prevents duplicative punishment and requires prosecutors to make strategic charging decisions upfront.
The opinion also establishes a high bar for defendants raising alternative causation defenses. Unidentified or unsupported medical theories cannot defeat convictions built on substantial expert testimony. This protects the integrity of abuse prosecutions while preserving defendants’ right to present legitimate alternative causes supported by credible evidence.