Background
Six unconnected appellants — Jay Davis, Jerry Tolbert, Dawayne McLaren, Jordan Webster, Stuart O’Neill, and Benjamin Hibbert — were sentenced between 2006 and 2010 under the now-repealed dangerous-offender provisions in Chapter 5, Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Depending on the date of sentence, each fell under one of two versions of the regime: the “first iteration” (in force 2005–2008) or the “second iteration” (as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and in force until repeal by LASPO 2012). The sentences imposed were either Detention for Public Protection (DPP, for those under 18 at conviction) or Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP, for those 18 and over), both of which operated in substance as life sentences with release governed by the Parole Board. The appellants’ ages at sentence ranged from 15 to 21.
The cases were consolidated and listed together because they raised common questions about how a sentencing court ought to have approached the age of the offender when deciding whether to impose an indeterminate sentence under either iteration of the scheme. Several appellants were referred by the Criminal Cases Review Commission; others brought late applications for leave. All but one (Hibbert) had been released by the Parole Board at least once but were subsequently recalled and remained in custody or on licence at the time of the appeal hearing in April 2026.
The central legal question was whether the original sentencing courts properly applied the principles established in R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864 and subsequent authorities, which required courts to treat indeterminate sentences as a last resort for young offenders and to give substantial weight to the capacity of children and young people to change and develop when assessing dangerousness.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal (Vice-President Lord Justice Edis, Lady Justice May, and Mr Justice Lavender) allowed the appeals of Davis, Tolbert, McLaren, Webster, and O’Neill, quashing the indeterminate sentences in each case and substituting determinate or extended sentences. Hibbert’s appeal was adjourned for the filing of psychiatric evidence to determine whether a Mental Health Act disposal should replace the indeterminate sentence. The court confirmed that, under both iterations of the regime, the imposition of a DPP or IPP on a child or young person was a sentence of last resort, available only where an extended sentence would be inadequate to protect the public — and that youth was a highly pertinent factor both in the dangerousness assessment itself and in the choice of sentence.
Drawing on Lang, R v JW [2009] 2 Cr App R (S) 94, and the Attorney-General’s Reference No. 55 of 2008, the court reaffirmed that children and young people have a significantly greater capacity to rehabilitate within a shorter timeframe than adults, that this must inform the assessment of significant risk of serious harm, and that an indeterminate sentence should not be imposed where an extended sentence with appropriate licence conditions could provide adequate public protection. Under the first iteration, for offenders under 18, DPP was not mandatory even on a finding of dangerousness; the court was required to consider whether an extended sentence would suffice before imposing DPP. Under the second iteration, IPP/DPP ceased to be mandatory for adults as well, and sentencers were required to treat the indeterminate sentence as the penultimate resort, imposing it only where the overall sentencing package of a determinate or extended sentence (with ancillary orders) could not achieve appropriate protection.
The court stressed that its ruling is confined to the repealed indeterminate sentencing regime and that the replacement sentences imposed — being long since served — have only academic significance and should not be read as guidance for sentencing under current provisions.
Key Takeaways
- Under both iterations of the CJA 2003 dangerous-offender regime, DPP and IPP were sentences of last resort; before imposing an indeterminate sentence on a young offender, courts were required to determine whether an extended sentence would adequately protect the public.
- Youth is a highly material consideration in the dangerousness assessment itself: children and young people may change and develop within a much shorter timeframe than adults, which can and often should lead to a different — and lower — risk classification than would apply to an adult with the same record.
- The case reaffirms the Lang principle that significant risk of serious harm is a high threshold — “noteworthy, of considerable amount or importance” — and that courts must not assume such risk merely because the index offence was serious or specified.
- Late appeals against indeterminate sentences remain available where an error of law in the original sentencing process can be demonstrated, consistent with R v Roberts [2016] 2 Cr App R (S) 14.
Why It Matters
Although the IPP and DPP sentences were abolished by LASPO 2012, hundreds of individuals sentenced under the old regime remain in custody or on licence. This decision provides authoritative guidance on the legal errors that may vitiate such sentences — in particular, the failure to treat youth as a weighty factor in both the dangerousness finding and the sentencing choice — and confirms that the CCRC and the courts retain jurisdiction to correct those errors through the appeal process.
More broadly, the judgment offers a detailed doctrinal account of the two iterations of the dangerous-offender scheme and the evolution of the case law under Lang, Johnson, JW, and the Attorney-General’s Reference No. 55 of 2008, providing a consolidated reference point for practitioners and academics working on legacy IPP/DPP cases and for policymakers considering the ongoing impact of indeterminate sentencing on those convicted as children or young people.