Background
ST, a vulnerable 15-year-old in Essex County Council’s care, had experienced more than 20 placement moves since 2017 and repeated episodes of self-harm and absconding that exposed her and others to serious risk. She had previously been subject to deprivation-of-liberty orders and, from December 2025, lived at a residential placement under restrictions including intensive staffing, locked doors and windows, possible physical restraint, and controls on access to sharp objects.
The placement was initially rated “Inadequate” by Ofsted, a fact not disclosed when the court authorised ST’s move there. The proceedings exposed deficient placement checks, delayed social-work oversight, nearly two years without meaningful education, and an absence of effective therapeutic provision. Eight hearings and repeated directions were required to obtain a clear account of ST’s circumstances and produce a coordinated care plan, monthly Team Around the Placement meetings, and a staged reduction in restrictions.
The Court’s Holding
Mrs Justice Theis held that the arrangements amounted to a deprivation of ST’s liberty. Applying the Supreme Court’s approach in Reference by Attorney General for Northern Ireland [2026] UKSC 16, the court evaluated the arrangements in their full context, including the degree of control, restrictions on movement, duration and purpose, available alternatives, and ST’s own experience and objections. The combination of intensive supervision, locked doors and windows, and potential restraint plainly crossed the threshold.
Although ST opposed the order, the court agreed with the Children’s Guardian that continued authorisation was necessary, proportionate, and in her best interests because of the continuing risks of self-harm and absconding. It therefore authorised the deprivation of liberty until 29 September 2026, allowing implementation of a staged plan that had reduced supervision to 2:1 and contemplated a further reduction to 1:1 if there were no additional missing-from-placement incidents.
The court nevertheless found that ST had been badly let down by her corporate parent. Her basic educational and mental-health needs had not been met, monitoring and coordination had been inadequate, and she remained trapped in a “catch 22” under which therapy was withheld until she showed the stability that therapy was intended to help her achieve. The judgment was directed to the local authority’s Director of Children’s Services.
Key Takeaways
- After AGNI, whether care arrangements constitute a deprivation of liberty requires a contextual, multifactorial assessment rather than isolated application of a single “acid test.”
- A child’s wishes, objections, and subjective experience are relevant, but they do not prevent authorisation where restrictions remain necessary and proportionate to address serious risks.
- Courts considering these applications should scrutinise placement ratings, social-worker visits, education, mental-health support, and arrangements for coordinated and continuing review.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates how the High Court will apply the revised Article 5 analysis to restrictive care arrangements for children while continuing to use the inherent jurisdiction where suitable statutory secure accommodation is unavailable. Theis J described the national shortage as a continuing “scandalous lack of provision,” noting evidence of 54 live secure-placement referrals but only five potential beds.
It also demonstrates that authorising restrictions does not validate the quality of the underlying care. Local authorities must provide evidence of active oversight, meaningful education, therapeutic planning, and a workable route toward reducing restrictions rather than relying on generic assurances or fragmented services.