Background
Jordan Lyden sought permission to appeal a First-tier Tribunal decision refusing to admit a late appeal against HMRC closure notices that increased his income-tax liability for two tax years. His notice of appeal was filed more than four months late.
Mr Lyden relied on his accountant’s lengthy illness, his own career-ending injury and mental-health difficulties, and a period spent in Australia with family. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that the accountant’s illness could have been a good reason, but found that it began only after the appeal was already two months late. It found the other explanations unsubstantiated or insufficient, noting evidence that Mr Lyden could communicate with his agent and that being in Australia did not prevent contact.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Nicholas Aleksander refused renewed permission to appeal. The Upper Tribunal held that none of Mr Lyden’s proposed grounds had a realistic prospect of showing a material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s refusal to allow the late appeal.
The First-tier Tribunal had applied the Martland criteria, considered the evidence and prejudice to Mr Lyden, and was entitled to give the factors the weight it did. It had also considered the underlying merits, finding neither that the appeal was doomed nor that it was very strong. Its 36-paragraph decision gave adequate reasons. The different statutory time limits applicable to taxpayers and HMRC did not itself affect the Martland assessment.
Key Takeaways
- An appellate tribunal will rarely interfere with a fact-finding tribunal’s weighting of factors in a late-appeal application.
- A taxpayer cannot delegate all responsibility for timely management of tax affairs to an accountant.
- Reasons need be proportionate; the First-tier Tribunal was not required to set out every step of its reasoning.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the high threshold for overturning a discretionary refusal to admit a late tax appeal. Illness and personal difficulties may be relevant, but the evidence must explain the delay during the relevant period.
It also confirms that disagreement with the First-tier Tribunal’s evaluation of prejudice, merits and evidence is not enough: an applicant for permission must identify an arguable material error of law.