Background
Mackie Motors (Brechin) Limited operated Renault, Nissan and Dacia dealerships in Scotland. In November 2021, after RCI Financial Services raised money-laundering concerns, Renault and Nissan withdrew Mackie Motors’ access to systems used to order vehicles and parts and perform other dealership functions. RCI subsequently terminated its financing contracts on seven days’ notice. Mackie Motors sold its sites to another dealer and alleged that the sale occurred at an undervalue.
In earlier proceedings against RCI, Mackie Motors unsuccessfully alleged an implied umbrella or relational agreement linking the financing and dealership arrangements. Its proposed amended claim was struck out, and the Court of Appeal dismissed its appeal. In 2025, Mackie Motors brought the present action against Renault, Nissan and RCI, alleging breaches of implied terms in the dealership agreements, RCI’s inducement or procurement of those breaches, and separate breaches concerning RCI’s repossession and sale of used-vehicle stock under the Used Vehicle Stocking Agreement.
The defendants applied to strike out the entire action as a Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, arguing that the claims could and should have been pursued in the earlier litigation. Alternatively, they sought summary judgment, principally contending that RCI’s lawful withdrawal of finance—not the loss of system access—caused Mackie Motors’ alleged losses.
The Court’s Holding
The High Court dismissed the strike-out application. Applying a broad, merits-based assessment, it held that the current action was not an abuse of process. Renault and Nissan had not been parties to the earlier claim, the claims now advanced against them had not previously been adjudicated, and there was no sufficient indication that the new proceedings constituted oppressive or unjust harassment.
The inducement claim against RCI was also not abusive because it was materially different from the earlier contractual claim and relied on evidence from a former RCI employee that became available only after the earlier appeal. The separate used-vehicle claim could have been included in the earlier proceedings, but the court held that it was not a claim that should have been advanced before the proposed amended pleading was refused and therefore was not abusive.
The court also refused summary judgment. Although it considered the defendants’ causation argument strong and thought it likely to prevail at trial, determining whether Mackie Motors would have sold its business if system access had remained available required resolving a fact-sensitive counterfactual. The claim’s prospects were therefore not merely fanciful, and deciding the issue summarily would have amounted to an impermissible mini-trial.
Key Takeaways
- A later claim is not necessarily abusive merely because it could have been pleaded in earlier proceedings; the court must conduct a broad, merits-based assessment, including whether the later action unjustly harasses the defendants.
- The fact that Renault and Nissan were not parties to the earlier litigation strongly supported allowing Mackie Motors to litigate claims against them that had never been adjudicated.
- A causation defence may appear likely to succeed at trial yet still fail on summary judgment when resolving it requires factual findings about a disputed counterfactual.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the limits of Henderson v Henderson abuse where a claimant advances distinct causes of action against new defendants or relies on genuinely later-discovered evidence. A prior failed attempt to plead an alternative contractual theory does not automatically bar every subsequent claim arising from the same commercial breakdown.
It also underscores the deliberately low threshold for resisting summary judgment. Even a claim the judge considers more likely than not to fail may proceed when its outcome depends on evidence and factual findings properly reserved for trial.