Background
Shane Matin appealed Personal Liability Notices arising from corporation tax and construction industry scheme liabilities of APQ Developments Ltd, of which HMRC identified him as the sole company officer. While that substantive appeal remained pending before the First-tier Tribunal, Matin applied under Rule 8 of the First-tier Tribunal Rules to bar HMRC from further participation.
Matin argued that HMRC had no realistic prospect of defending the appeal and had failed to cooperate with the tribunal through delay, procedural misconduct, and non-compliance with a direction requiring a response to his barring application. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that HMRC reasonably sought a copy of an application it had not received and had not procedurally defaulted. It also considered the no-reasonable-prospect argument premature because HMRC had not yet served its Statement of Case and only limited material about the underlying dispute was available.
After both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal on the papers refused permission to appeal, Matin sought reconsideration under Rule 22(4) of the Upper Tribunal Rules. Because of his continuing ill health, he asked for the renewed application to be decided on written materials rather than at an oral hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The Upper Tribunal refused the renewed application for permission to appeal. It held that none of Matin’s five grounds identified an arguable material error of law in the earlier refusal of permission or any other compelling reason for an appeal.
The tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal was entitled to conclude that HMRC had not defaulted: HMRC had not received the barring application and reasonably requested both a copy and additional time to respond. Arguments based on relief from sanctions, unequal procedural treatment, Rule 2, equality of arms, and Article 6 therefore lacked their essential premise.
The tribunal also rejected challenges concerning the decision to determine the barring application on the papers and the treatment of documentary evidence. The procedural decision about whether a hearing was necessary addressed a different question from the merits of the barring application. The First-tier Tribunal gave adequate reasons for rejecting both bases for barring HMRC, and Matin’s disagreement with the weight assigned to the evidence did not establish an arguable error of law.
Key Takeaways
- Permission to appeal from the First-tier Tribunal requires an arguable material error of law, not merely disagreement with factual findings or evidential weight.
- Relief-from-sanctions principles do not assist unless a procedural default has first been established.
- Evidence relevant to a case-management decision need not carry the same significance in the later determination of an application’s merits.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the demanding threshold for challenging case-management and evidential conclusions on appeal. A party must identify a genuine legal error rather than invite the Upper Tribunal to reassess findings reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal.
It also confirms that barring a respondent under Rule 8 is not an automatic consequence of alleged delay. The tribunal must determine whether there was a failure to cooperate serious enough to prevent fair and just adjudication, or whether the respondent has no realistic prospect of successfully defending the proceedings.