Background
This judgment addresses consequential matters following an earlier appellate decision ([2026] EWHC 1575 (Ch), 26 June 2026) in which HHJ Paul Matthews allowed Ocorian Private Trustees’ appeal against decisions by HHJ Glen dated 23 February 2026. The original dispute concerned possession of Stapleford Farm. Julia McGeoch had occupied the property under a written license granted by deed in 2009, which provided explicitly that it did not create a tenancy or exclusive possession. The appellant sought possession after determining the license, but HHJ Glen refused applications to strike out the defense and for summary judgment, and allowed McGeoch to amend her defense and introduce a counterclaim. On appeal, all of those decisions were reversed.
The current judgment resolves three remaining issues: whether the High Court should make a possession order itself or remit to the county court; what costs orders should be made; and whether to stay execution pending a potential second appeal to the Court of Appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The court made a possession order for Stapleford Farm to take effect in six weeks’ time, rather than remitting the matter to the county court. Although the respondent had admitted the appellant’s registered ownership, and all pleaded defenses had been defeated, the court allowed the six-week suspension by consent to accommodate the respondent’s intention to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The court noted that registered ownership of a legal estate in fee simple carries with it a prima facie right to possession; once the respondent’s license was determined, she became a trespasser. While the Housing Act 1980, section 89(1) normally limits postponement of possession orders to 14 days (with a six-week maximum in cases of exceptional hardship), the court held that section 89 does not apply to former licensees who become trespassers, as it only limits existing powers to suspend rather than creating new powers to do so.
On costs, the court ordered that the respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the possession proceedings (including the strike-out/summary judgment application and amendment application) and the costs of the appeal, subject to detailed assessment on the standard basis if not agreed. The court rejected the respondent’s conduct-based arguments for a 50% reduction, finding that the appellant’s spare particulars of claim complied with CPR and Practice Direction 55A requirements, and that the redaction of Jersey proceedings documents had been approved by the Jersey court and did not warrant a reduction. An interim payment on account of £106,000 was ordered, payable within 14 days. This was calculated as approximately 60% of the £98,053 in solicitor-certified costs schedules and 40% of uncertified costs claimed. The court refused to stay either the possession order or the costs order pending appeal, finding no solid grounds for a stay and no risk of irremediable harm to the respondent, who had substantial financial resources including proceeds from a €2 million property sale and business assets.
Key Takeaways
- Registered ownership of land confers a prima facie right to possession; when the respondent admitted the appellant’s title and all defenses were defeated, the appellant had made out its case without need for further county court determination.
- A former licensee whose license has been terminated becomes a trespasser; the Housing Act 1980 protections on postponement of possession do not apply to trespassers as they do to former tenants holding over.
- Costs follow the event under the general rule; procedural niceties in pleading (such as spare initial particulars supplemented by reply) do not constitute “conduct” warranting departure from that rule where the party has complied with the applicable rules and practice directions.
- An interim payment on account of costs should ordinarily be ordered under CPR 44.2(8) absent good reason; the court may award different percentages of certified versus uncertified costs based on the robustness of the evidence.
- A stay of execution pending appeal is the exception, not the rule; the party seeking a stay must show solid grounds and a real risk of irremediable harm, supported by cogent evidence of financial circumstances; unsubstantiated assertions of hardship and vague references to future difficulties do not suffice.
Why It Matters
This judgment clarifies the treatment of possession claims involving former licensees, whose status as trespassers upon termination of the license provides fewer procedural protections under housing legislation than tenants receive. The decision reinforces that registered title carries intrinsic rights to possession that require a respondent to mount an affirmative defense; mere admission of title forecloses further factual disputes. It demonstrates the court’s application of a strict evidentiary standard when a respondent seeks to defer enforcement of costs orders or possession orders pending an appeal, requiring specific financial disclosure rather than general assertions of hardship.
For practitioners, the judgment offers useful guidance on the intersection of possession procedures (governed by CPR Part 55 and Practice Direction 55A), costs principles, and appellate stay practice. It confirms that the court’s discretion to grant interim payments on account of costs is not absolute but operates within a framework where the court will normally make such orders; the respondent’s challenge to the percentage (rather than the principle) of interim payment was therefore insufficient. The case also illustrates how courts approach six-week suspensions of possession orders at the appellant’s consent when delay would serve the interests of appellate justice without unduly prejudicing the successful party.