R v Bignell — Court upheld payment of a cracked-trial fee rather than a full trial fee

Case
R v Bignell
Court
High Court of Justice, Senior Courts Costs Office (United Kingdom)
Date Decided
30 September 2026
Citation
[2026] EWHC 2495 (SCCO)
Topics
Criminal legal aid, Graduated fees, Cracked trials, Trial commencement

Background

Lloyds PR Solicitors represented Martikka Bignell in the Crown Court at St Albans on charges of possessing crack cocaine with intent to supply and supplying crack cocaine. The prosecution alleged that Bignell and three co-defendants operated a county drugs line, relying principally on electronic communications, CCTV, mobile-phone downloads and financial records. Bignell pleaded not guilty, and a four-to-five-day trial was listed for 26 August 2025.

On 26 August, co-defendant Karl Beaumont pleaded guilty, reducing the estimated length of Bignell’s trial, but uncertainty remained over which judge could hear it. No jury was sworn. Before the case returned the following afternoon, the prosecution disclosed material concerning Bignell’s allegations that another co-defendant had abused and threatened her and coerced her into drug use and dealing. The parties agreed a basis of plea, and Bignell pleaded guilty to both counts. The Legal Aid Agency paid the solicitors a cracked-trial fee under the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013; the firm appealed, claiming the higher fee payable once a trial has started.

The Court’s Holding

Costs Judge Leonard dismissed the appeal, holding that Bignell’s trial had not begun in a meaningful sense under the principles stated in Lord Chancellor v Henery [2011] EWHC 3246 (QB). Bignell’s case occupied only a few minutes on 26 August while the court considered judicial availability, and when it came before a different judge on 27 August it proceeded directly to guilty pleas.

The intervening disclosure, negotiation and agreement of a basis of plea did not amount to substantial case management sufficient to commence a trial. Nothing was submitted to a judge for decision, and there was no evidence of a dispute requiring negotiation or judicial resolution. Revising the prosecution opening, agreed facts and jury bundle after Beaumont’s plea was ordinary trial preparation. The listing office’s description of the matter as a two-day trial did not outweigh the hearing transcripts, which showed that no trial occurred.

Key Takeaways

  • A listed trial does not begin merely because the case is called before the court or work continues on the scheduled trial date; it must start in a meaningful sense.
  • Last-minute disclosure, plea negotiations and agreement of a basis of plea are characteristic of a cracked trial, particularly when no disputed issue is put before the judge.
  • Administrative court records describing proceedings as a trial are not conclusive; reliable transcripts and any contemporaneous indication from the trial judge carry greater weight.

Why It Matters

The decision reinforces the distinction between a cracked-trial fee and the higher graduated fee payable after a trial has begun. Ordinary trial preparation and successful doorstep negotiations do not become substantial case management simply because they occur on or after the listed trial date.

Practitioners seeking a full trial fee need evidence that proceedings crossed the meaningful-start threshold, such as an opening, evidence, substantive judicial rulings or substantial case management connected to the trial process. Where commencement may later be disputed, counsel should consider asking the trial judge to record a view at the time.

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