Background
Jake Worsley was involved in a head-on collision on 15 December 2022 and was taken to hospital with a serious leg injury. Police conducted a blood specimen procedure at the hospital using the MGDD/C form (standard form for drink and drug driving cases). Worsley did not provide a specimen. He was charged with two offences: driving without due care and attention (to which he pleaded guilty) and failing to provide a blood specimen contrary to section 7(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
The trial of the specimen charge occurred on 30 May 2025 before three magistrates. The central issues were whether the police officer had followed correct procedure and whether the evidence should be excluded under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). At the close of the prosecution case, the defence applied to exclude the evidence, arguing that the officer had acted unfairly by relying on medical consent given 56 minutes earlier despite the defendant appearing confused and concussed. The magistrates refused the application.
What followed was extraordinary: immediately after the defence closed its case without calling evidence, the bench Chair announced without consulting colleagues and before hearing closing submissions that they had “find the matter proven” and would “move to sentencing.” Only after the legal adviser intervened to remind them they had not heard closing arguments did the Chair apologize and invite closing submissions from both counsel.
The Court’s Holding
Mrs Justice Hill granted judicial review and quashed the conviction on the ground that the magistrates had violated the defendant’s fundamental right to make closing submissions before being convicted. The court held that the law has been clear since 1865 that a defendant in a criminal trial has an absolute right to make closing submissions at the end of evidence, or to have one made by counsel on their behalf. This right is currently enshrined in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025 at 24.3(3)(i).
The court found that the magistrates’ decision to announce a verdict before hearing any closing submissions was a serious procedural failing akin to those considered in landmark cases such as R v Young [1964] 1 WLR 717 and R v Midhurst Justices, ex p Thompson [1974] QB 137. Using the test from Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, the court concluded that a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that justice was not done. The conviction could not stand on this ground.
The court also found that the magistrates’ refusal to state a case had been improper: the decision was made by a trainee legal adviser rather than by the justices themselves, contrary to the requirement in section 111 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 that applications to state a case must be decided by “the justices composing the court.”
Key Takeaways
- A defendant’s right to make or have made closing submissions before conviction is a fundamental procedural safeguard that has existed in English law for over 160 years and cannot be bypassed.
- Convicting a defendant before hearing closing submissions constitutes a serious breach of natural justice, rendering the conviction unsafe regardless of the strength of the prosecution case.
- Applications to refuse to state a case must be decided by the magistrates themselves, not by court staff; a trainee legal adviser cannot make this decision unilaterally.
- A refusal to state a case based on characterizing an application as “frivolous” must be properly reasoned; unexplained refusals may lead to unnecessary litigation and will not be upheld on judicial review.
Why It Matters
This decision reaffirms the constitutional importance of closing submissions in criminal trials and provides clarity that procedural safeguards cannot be overridden, even in seemingly straightforward cases. For magistrates’ courts and practitioners, it reinforces that the procedural framework for criminal trials is not merely technical but foundational to fair proceedings. The judgment also clarifies the proper procedure for refusing to state a case: such decisions are decisions of the bench, not administrative officers, and must be explained in writing rather than summarily rejected.
The case serves as a reminder that appellate courts will scrutinize not only substantive errors but also fundamental procedural breaches, and that remitting cases for retrial is the appropriate remedy when fairness has been compromised. For the Crown Prosecution Service’s concession on this ground, the judgment demonstrates institutional commitment to procedural integrity in criminal proceedings.